INTRODUCTION
Communal claims for territory are one of the basic threats for peace in the
post-Cold War world. Universalization of liberal democracy gives peoples freedom
for expression and endows them with room for action. In other words, "democratization
involves the unblocking of channels of political expression and allows for increased
means for political organization, empowering opposition forces for anti-regime
struggle." (Auvinen & Kivimäki 1997, 7). In a world made of states
which frequently incorporate several nationalities, the fatal attraction for
the territorialization of nations has every pontential, becoming one of
the worst peace-disturbing factors for the coming century (Niebuhr. 1932. 59).
It is already a matter of concern that, presently, "more than two hundred ethnic
and religious minorities and subordinate majorities throughout the world [...]
are contesting the terms of their incorporation into the 'world order'"(Gurr.
1993. IX).
It is a good thing to try to solve territorial claims once they outburst into open confrontation. It is a better option to prevent them from escalating into open forms of mass violence.
This chapter discusses the negotiation practices and examines the conditions for effectiveness for initiatives aiming at preventing violence and violent escalation, in situations where a communal group claims its own territory within the context of a sovereign state. "Territorial claim" refers to: a situation of conflict in which an organized group of people--a "communal group"--claims for a mutually exclusive (secession) or an accommodative inclusive (autonomy, power-sharing, decentralization) right for ownership over a piece of land which is, or, is supposed to be, an integral part of a sovereign state. This means that cases of border conflicts between two or more sovereignties are not taken into consideration, but situations of contested decolonization (Western Sahara) or aborted incorporation within the international borders of a sovereign state are (Eritrea, East Timor, etc.).
For preventive action to be effective, we need a sound knowledge of what exactly
constitutes the problem, that is, the stakes and attitudes in confrontation.
Since "the transition from war to peace is essentially the reverse of the transition
from peace to war, what causes nations to cease fighting one another must be
relevant in explaining what causes nations to begin fighting one another." (Blainey.
1973. VIII). Consequently, a sound understanding of the explanatory factors
of the claims (stakes), and, most importantly, of what makes these claims to
escalate into open forms of mass violence (attitudes) is determinant for the
search of the most productive ways and means (tactics) to prevent this escalation.
Efforts to prevent violence outbreak or contain violence escalation in a communal
claim for territory "must be preceded by an understanding of the sources and
patterns of that conflict." (Horowitz, 564).
Scientific Analysis and the Universalization of Categories
This approach implies that we should proceed beyond the methodological orientations
imposed, for instance, by a case-study context. Consequently, we need a rigorously
elaborated taxonomy of stakes, attitudes and tactics. What is a territorial
claim? Why territory is claimed and how? What preventive tactics are the most
effective? What are the basic enfeebling factors for negotiation or transactional
practices and processes? These are important questions for which we need rigorously
framed general answers, that is, not specific answers for each specific case
of territorial contest, but globalized categories for territorial claims in
general. It remains however a matter of great importance to keep in mind
that each case of territorial claim is specifically unique--per se--for
it depends on contextual and circumstantial factors and parameters.
The ultimate ambition of the study is to put into perspective a taxonomy of
the constant general situations and relationships leading to, or condemning
preventive initiatives in cases of territorial claims. This general explanatory
nomenclature should allow us, to systematically establish commonalties--for
situations of violence escalation or violence de-escalation--among such varied
and contextually specific cases of territorial claims as the Chiapas insurrection
in Mexico, the Sahrawi rebellion in Western Sahara, the Ibo uprising in Nigeria,
the Tamil fighting in Bangladesh, the IRA war in Northern Ireland, the Kashmiri
unrest in India, the Basque and Corsican struggles for self-determination in
Spain and France respectively, the French-speaking Canadian claims for a "free
Quebec" in Canada, the German-speaking Italian struggle for cultural exceptionality
in South Tyrol, or the White South African extremists battle for a Volkstaat
in South Africa. This way of proceeding will also help to understand why and
how, in some cases, preventive diplomacy action is effective, and, why and how
in others, it is not.
A scientific issue-area study of preventive action effectiveness, or non-effectiveness,
in situations of territorial claim requires "explanation[s] that will hold cross
culturally," the "definition of basic principles by which to classify cases,
[and] an understanding of patterns of conflicts.» (Horowitz. 1985. XI).
Once these methodological "mise au point" are made, we can now turn to our
first basic question: why territory is claimed by a communal group within
the context of a sovereign state?
WHY PEOPLE REBEL AGAINST A "NATIONAL" TERRITORIAL ORDER
I. The Conflict: Territory as a "Common Good" and Territory as a "Need"
A state's territory is normally a common good, an equally shared heritage for
the citizens of this state. For that reason, territory is considered to be one
of the three basic components--together with people and a government--which
endow a state with a sovereign moral personality universally recognized by the
law and the community of nations. As long as a state's territory is perceived
as a patrimonial asset equally possessed and enjoyed by the whole assembly of
citizens, there is no room for territorial claims.
Territorial claims occur when the "national territory"--or, what the state's
authorities suppose to be the "national territory"--is no longer perceived as
a common good by a concerned group of citizens and becomes a « need »
for this specific group. Territorial claims are about the desacralization of
this territorial absoluteness. They represent iconoclastic uprisings from "politically
active communal groups" determined to question the absolutely sacred dogma of
the state's territorial integrity. For basically being a process of deconstruction
and desinstitutionalization of the national state's order and boundaries, this
clash of perceptions of stakes is full of the seeds of instability and violence.
But what, at a specific point in time, makes a specific group of people become
"heretics" and openly question the sacred absoluteness of the "national territory?"
Why do people rebel against territorial order? For a « politically-assertive
communal group» (Gurr 1995. 1), how is the transition, from the perception of
the state's territory as a common good to the new contradictory and "desacralizing"
perception of the "national territory" as a basic human need developed? In fact,
if we know the process leading from peace to violence in situation of territorial
claim, if we thoroughly know how territorial claims run from non-violent enunciation
to violent affirmation, by "turning [the available explanation on its] head"
(Zartman. 1995. 3), it will be easy to determine what are most efficient tactics
for violence prevention.
The fact that what is considered to be a portion of a sovereign state's territory
becomes a need for a given group of people is essentially a political issue.
Since politics is a matter of who gets what, when and how, this need for "national"
territory is fundamentally a need for a different and better governance, that
is, a new and "just" power distribution, in terms of goods, justice, well-being,
symbols and hopes. Yet, in the process, "politics" is just the tree hiding the
forest, for the real ultimate objective simmering behind the smoky screen of
politicized claims is about the basic tangible and intangible « human needs »
of the claiming group (human deprivations, human frustrations, human dissatisfactions,
human humiliations, human insecurity, human ambitions, human hopes and dreams
as related to the enjoyment or the non enjoyment of a « national »
territory). Hence, the answer to the question "why people rebel against a given
territorial order within the context of a given sovereignty?" can find a first-degree
answer in some basic conclusions of human needs theories (Gillwald. 1990. 118).
II. Basic Human Needs and Claims for Territory
Our classificatory scheme considers that people rebel against a given state's
territorial to satisfy at least three fundamental needs: security, identity
and prosperity.
1. Security.
A politically-assertive communal group rebels against a state's territorial
order when the claiming party perceives the claimed territory as an important
component of its security. That is, (1) members of the group do not consider
their security fully assured within the context of the existing national territorial
order, and (2) they believe that the only way for salvation is the remaking
of the territorial order through the establishment of a new sovereignty (secession)
or the reconfiguration of authority (integration, decentralization, autonomy).
This security obsession can be reciprocal. Against the communal groups claim
on the territory as asset for its security, the state frequently considers that
the loss of the claimed territory will jeopardize its security. An example of
such a situation is the case of the Palestinians and the state of Israel. From
this reciprocal obsession for territorial security comes the highly complicated
nature of the "territory for peace" solution in this part of the world. When
the Representative of Israel to the United Nations declares that "Israel's aim
has always been to have the right to live in an area where peace and security
prevail," (Yativ. 1992. 1) or, when the former Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir,
affirms that "peace without security will be a disaster for Israel," (in Corm.
1997. 118) they both express this obsession for security which animate both
Israel and the Palestinian people. In the same way, the Ibos risingup for a
"separate state"--the "state of Biafra"--in Nigeria during
the sixties was largely explained by the fact that they strongly felt their
physical and economic security was no longer guaranteed in the "non-Ibo" regions
of Nigeria--precisely in the Northern part where there were massive and merciless
"anti-Ibo pogroms," accompanied by ransacking of the wealth of the rich Ibo
traders and businessmen (Balencie & De La Grange, I, 318-319).
2. Identity.
"Claims to preserve identity" (UNPREDEP 1996. 27) are a potentially explosive
way of the stakes when the claimed piece of land is considered to be a "constitutive"
part of the claiming group's identity. Jerusalem in the Middle East, Quebec
for the French-speaking Canadians, Corsica for the Corsicans in France, or Southern
Sudan for non-Muslim and non-Arab Sudanese (at least until 1972), are instances
of such a situation.
The former Soviet Union contains many cases where the seductive appeal for national territories for the sake of national identities leads to escalating violence. Ethnic identity has long played a strong role in the in the Caucasian region where the notion of "people's right of self-determination" developed by Lenin." (article 9 of the Communist party program). For the communist "good cause" against capitalist colonialism has become, seven decades later, a determinant factor in the disastrous dislocation of the communist dream. Today merciless struggles for "national" identities and territories remind us that--in Trotsky's words--the Soviet union has never been a "national state", but just a "state of nationalities" (Trotsky. 1979, Goldenberg. 1994, Frederick. 1996).
In Western Cameroon, Quebec, South Tyrol and Eustradi, linguistic groups consider
a specific territory to be necessary to their identity. Although Cameroon has
two official languages, French and English, "Anglophone separatist militantism"
claims a separate status for its territory. (Balencie I 1996. 327). The case
of English-speaking Cameroonians resembles that of French-speaking Canadians
in Quebec, who present "a very strong sense of group identity and […] little
desire or opportunity for assimilation into the Anglo-Canadian majority." (Gurr
1993. 159). German-speaking Italians in South Tyrol, a community "with a strong
sense of ethnic self-identity", appeal for "for greater autonomy," for their
territory within Italy. (Gurr 1993. 157). The Spanish Basques, who were briefly
autonomous under the Spanish Republic in the 1930s, were subordinated to a severely
centralized and authoritarian state and denied all manifestations of cultural
or political identity from 1939 until Franco's death in 1975. Consequently,
a "radical faction of the Basque independence movement, Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna
(ETA)" is leading "a terrorist campaign for complete independence" of the "Basque
nation," despite a reinstatement of autonomy since Francos ….. (Gurr 1993. 154-155)
Similar territorial claims for the sake of identity also play a role in the Casamance, Buttany and South Africa. There is the Volkstaat project, a separatist ambition aiming at preserving and protecting the "white identity" in a pluralist South Africa through the creation of a specific political entity for "the only white indigenous tribe of Africa." or a "tenth white province" constituted of the regions where Afrikaners represent "an important proportion of the population."(Balencie I 1996. 498-99). To the opposite of the "white state" dream is the Inkhata Freedom Party aspirations for a Kwazulu-Natal State within a federal republic of South Africa in order to "give a land"--or keeping in its "fatherland"--to the "Zulu nation" for a better preservation of the "Zulu identity." (Balencie I 1996. 500). Similarly, the Bretons in France "have since 1898 given birth to a succession of regionalist movements. These movements are rooted in [among other factors] their distinct Celtic language and customs." (Gurr 1993. 155; Reece 1977). A 1975 poll showed that half of all inhabitants of Buttany identified themselves as being as much Breton as French, and one-quarter felt more Breton than French." (Gurr 1993. 155). The Diolas of Casamance (Senegal) feel to more Casamancsais than Senegalese. For years, they have been fighting for the "liberation of Casamance" and the elimination of the "rampant cultural and linguistic assimilation" by the Dakar Government (Balencie 1996. 264).
In the absence of a single ethnicity or language, territory itself can be the source of identity, where "dissimilar groups voluntarily choose to live territorially separate within the same sovereign State" (Eide 1996. 25) or, for secessioned claims, in a different new sovereignty. In Chad, people from the Southern region of the country do not feel any commondenty with the Northerners who have been governing Chad since 1975 when they over threw the government of François Tomabalbaye, a Southerner with whom they in turn felt no common identity. Southern secessionist aspirations were nearly realized during the weak and anarchic regime of Goukouni Weddeye in 1980. (Balencie I 1996. 224). In Sudan, Southern Sudanese rebelled against the Muslim government in Khartoum from 1955 to 1972 and then after 1983. Many Southerners felt their communal identity deeply threatened and by Arabization and Islamization from the North so claim a national territory in which this threaten identity will be secure, although they are torn between aspiration for federal autonomy and full independence.
In Northern Somalia (Somaliland) two areas of former colonization inhabited by different clans of the same ethnic group, have never succeeded in melting into one nation. In 1991, after the overthrow of the Somali dictator, Muhammad Siad Barre, Somaliland proclaimed its "independence," which no one has recognized. (Balencie I 1996. 432). In all these cases, violent conflict arises from assertions of identity incarnated in territory.
3. Prosperity.
There are two different situations of territorial claims for the sake of prosperity or material well-being:
Claims stemming from and claims from abundance
In claims from poverty, the claiming group feels that it is unfavorably discriminated
in the sharing of the national wealth. For that reason, this group affirms its
"right to economic and social development" and claims for the establishment
of a new and "just" territorial order. These words from a Chiapas (Mexico) peasant
tell a lot about the unjust wealth distribution as a basic explanation of the
Chiapas' claims for a new territorial order in Mexico: "misery is everywhere
[…] we [i.e. the Chiapas] have nothing to eat, we have no money, we have nothing
[….] We work a lot, but we never benefit from our efforts." Consequently, the
Chiapas not only claim, but violently fight for a new and "just" territorial
order. Says one of the Chiapas "freedom fighter" about a "liberated" area of
this region: "we have declared Huitiupan an autonomous area. We have named a
[new] president for the one who was there before was not constitutional: he
was not elected by a popular vote." (Lemoine. 1996). In the 1960s strong independentist
claims from Quebec (in Canada) were in part motivated by the "economic injustice"
noticeable in the province to the detriment of the Francophones. (Balencie I
1996. 183). Similarly, "the historical poverty and isolation of Brittany vis-à-vis
the rest of France provided the more immediate impetus for regional political
movements and separatist action after 1945" (Gurr 1993. 155).
In claims from abundance, the claimed territory is endowed with rich resources,
and the claimants consider these resources as "legitimately" being theirs. The
Anglophone secessionist militancy in Western Cameroon takes its explosive character
because of the important oil resources in the South Western province. (Balencie
I 1996. 328). In the former Zaire--today the Democratic Republic of Congo--,
a vast country regularly shaken by centrifugal dynamics, the Katanga's secessionist
crises in the early sixties with Moïse Tschombé together with the
development of a Katangese identity discourse is partly explained by the fact
that the region is rich in precious minerals. The same is true for the Kasai
region, which contains the main mines of diamond of the country (Balencie I
1996, 392, 406). In Angola, Cabindan nationalism among the 250 000 inhabitants
arises from the fact that the tiny enclave of 7,270 km2 is so extravagantly
rich in oil reserves that it is sometimes called the "African Koweit;" the separatists
hope that one day the "Cabindese nation" will fully enjoy the benefit of "its"
oil. (Balencie I 1996. 522-523). Similarly, the tireless and merciless Chechens
struggle for independence is animated, among other factors, by the hope that
the important oil resources of Chechnia can become a determinant "basis for
an independent developmental process" of the "Chechen nation. (Longuet-Marx.
1996). In Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville island is [since 1988] a prey of
a separatist guerilla, justified by the fact that the "Islanders are deeply
unhappy with the modalities of exploitation of the important mining resources"
in "their" island. (Balencie II 1996. 326). In Chad, the prospects of the coming
oil exploitation is already leading to a renewal of a "separatist fever" in
the country. Some Southern rebellious movements, like the Forces armées
de la république fédérale (Armed Forces of the Federal
republic [FARF]) categorically refuse that their oil benefit the "people from
the North[ern part of the country]." (Balencie I 1996. 227).
Far from being generated by an atavistic aggregative basic instinct, many of
these separatist struggles are the consequence of the state's hyper-centralization
policy. Harsh and tactless policies to unify and homogenize creates feelings
of insecurity among communal groups and leads to the dislocation of the national
unity ambition (Clastre 1974). Horowitz (1985, p. 567-8) rightly observes that
"several groups that underwent cultural revivals in order to thwart tendencies
to assimilation also became strongly separatist, and conscious policies of assimilation
have frequently provoked the same response." Consequently, one of the basic
task of preventive diplomacy in such an uncertain and fearful environment is
not only to re-establish trust and confidence, but also to reconfigure the exercise
of political power so that the decision-making and decision-taking processes
become participatory, undertaken with the full participation of all the segments
of the society.
The above-mentioned stimulative factors of territorial claims--security, identity,
prosperity--are not mutually exclusive; overlapping is the rule rather than
the exception. For instance, a feeling of communal solidarity through the recognizance
of a common identity can be at the basis of a territorial claim for prosperity
if the territory on which the politically-active communal group lives is endowed
with rich natural resources (oil, minerals, etc). Similarly, members of a communal
group may feel their security at stake because of their commonly shared
identity. Most often also, the claiming group feels it is a victim of a "pervasive
social discrimination" (Gurr 1993. 67) because it is a precisely identified
group or the group would like to enjoy positive discrimination because of its
specific position in a specific part of the national territory as a specific
communal group different of the rest of the citizens.
To be effective, preventive action should, not only be thoroughly informed
of the basic reasons pushing people to rebel against a given state's territorial
order, but also be aware of the perception of the conflict by the protagonists.
Perceptions determine the nature of the confrontational "game."
THE NATURE OF THE GAME
The nature of the game refers to the attitudes of the protagonists as they
fight each other. Is the confrontational process undertaken under a merciless
zero-sum logic of "the winner takes all" while the loser loses it all? Is there
any perception of the possibility of mutually benefiting trade-off or compromise?
Are we facing an "indeterminate" situation of a chicken Dilemma Game? One obvious
thing is that there is no clearly cut answer to the question concerning the
name of the game.
Beyond the basic needs for security or prosperity, many of the above-mentioned
claims are about the glorification of the claiming group's identity
(recognition and prestige). This appears to be a tough point for preventive
diplomacy. In the words of Donald L. Horowitz: "since group prestige or well
being is relative, many claims will be zero-sum and therefore not susceptible
to a strategy of enhancing everyone's rewards." Moreover, when the issue at
stake is mainly recognition and prestige, the stakes are mainly "symbolic, [and]
symbolic demands seem to be less compromisable than claims that can be quantified."
(Horowitz 1985. 566).(1)
One of the basic characteristics of territorial claims is that the object
of the conflict is a zero-supply elasticity asset. That is, the claimed
territory cannot be expanded or multiplied. In situation of a secessionist claim,
what is won by one side is automatically loose by the other. Compromise can
be found at the level of the partition of the cake, but, in terms of the total
sum of territory in contest, there is no possibility for enlargement. In such
a situation of zero-supply elasticity, attitudes toward and perceptions of the
stakes define the nature of the game. Consequently, claims for territory can
follow three main paths: hard zero-sum, soft-zero-sum, and
gray-zone, depending on the attitudes or degree of determination of
the parties to pay whatever price is required to reach their goal.
I. Hard Zero-Sum Situation.
When the issue is "security", the very survival of the claiming group is considered
to be at stake. Consequently, the conflict tends to be perceived as a matter
of life or death and a hard zero-sum game. In such a situation, accommodation
and compromise are very unlikely to happen as long as the claiming party continue
to perceive its incorporation within the state order as suicidal. The attitude
is a « us-or-them » one and the probability of escalation is high.
The typical case of this hardzero-sum scenario is the Israeli-Arab conflict,
particularly before the Osto Accords. Palestinians consider the claimed territories
to be not only a matter of "communal" home, but also an issue of their very
survival. Hence the extremely hard attitude vis-à-vis Israel, the
occupying foe. Hence, Egyptian President Nasser once said, in the name of the
Arab Nation, "our basic aim will be to destroy Israel." (quoted in Lindsey.
1992. 61). The zero-sum nature of the game is "doubly hardened" when, in response
to the extreme position of the claiming group, the Israeli Government responds
with an equally annihilative attitude. Since the stake, the disputed territory,
cannot be multiplied or enlarged, the situation becomes one of a suicidal "cohabitation"
between two equally determined protagonists engaged in a merciless and hardzero-sum
struggle for security, indeed, for life.
II. Soft Zero-Sum Situation
When the issue is a matter of prosperity, a soft zero-sum game results.
At this level, possibilities for accommodation and compromise do exist to the
extent that the distributive problem can find a more or less constructive and
mutually rewarding solution In Cabinda, Brittany, South Tyrol, or even Quebec,
the promotion of economic and social prosperity in the claimed regions has greatly
soften the nature of the war game between the concerned communal group and the
state.
III. Gray-Zone Situation
Issues engaging group identity produce a gray-zone situation. The
nature of the process is determined by the intensity of the claiming group's
parochial feelings, the density of committed power and engagement, the strength
of contextual factors such as external support and the degree of overlap between
the identity factor and the other two needs, security and prosperity. The fact,
for instance, that the security and prosperity factors are quite unsubstantial
in the French-speaking Canadians claims for a "free Quebec, and the security
factor is absent in the claims of the Bretons or South Tyroleans, explains;
among other factors, why these conflicts hardly escalate beyond the level of
a constitutional confrontation in which compromise and accommodation are the
rule and rough intolerance and non-mutual understanding the exception.
FIVE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS: A ROAD MAP FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
Once the reasons for the territorial claim and the nature of the conflictual
process are established, the third step on the road to preventive diplomacy
is to determine the fundamental characteristics of the conflict itself.
Asymmetry.
Claims for territory generally oppose a state (the stronger protagonist) to
a fraction of its citizens (the weaker protagonist). They are conflicts "between
a dominant center and a peripheral group." (Eide 1996. 9). For that reason,
and as internal conflicts, they are « structurally […] marked by asymmetry. »
This is a tough point for preventive diplomacy since asymmetry is a characteristic
generally considered unconducive to negotiation. One may think that this
flaw can be overcome by redressing this asymmetry and, as such, balancing the
situation. Unfortunately, case studies show that « attempts to redress
asymmetry only further complicate negotiation dynamics. » (Zartman. 1995.
3-4). This dramatically asymmetric nature of territorial conflicts pushes the
weaker party to avoid a face-to-face confrontation, in a classic war, with the
stronger party and explains why most territorial contests are low intensity
wars without front undertaken with guerilla strategy.
Fixed Stakes
A state's territory is a fixed asset. It does not vary. Consequently, any increase
in the demand or claims for territory can never be met by an increase in the
supply of the "goods." This makes of the territorial claims highly complicated
issues for preventive action. The fact that these are civil conflicts make them
more difficult to negotiate. Civil confrontations seem to have an inherent tendency
to intractability. Statistics show that « only a quarter to a third of
modern civil wars (including anticolonial wars) have found their way to negotiation,
whereas half of modern interstate wars have done so. About two thirds of the
internal conflicts have ended in the surrender or elimination of one of the
parties involved; fewer than a quarter of the international conflicts have so
ended. » If « internal conflict is so obdurately resistant to negotiations »(Zartman,
1995. 3; Pillar. 1983.... Stedman. 1990...), when a conflict happens to be both
an internal one and a claim for territory, the issue becomes nearly intractable.
III. Stratification.
Claims for territory are usually conflicts with more than one « dimensions ».
They are "multi-layered" confrontations with a communal dimension, a regional
dimension and sometimes an international dimension. They are conflict with a
strong appeal for external intrusion. For being both territorial and civil conflicts,
this « external dimension » is quite a universal characteristic for
these kind of conflicts. In general « few internal wars are purely internal. »
Many of them, while being more or less « relatively autonomous and self-sufficient
[…] have substantial and often dominant international dimension. » For
territorial claims, « internal rebellions […] necessarily mirror regional
conflicts because of transnational populations and interests." When, for a state,
"the overarching state identity breaks down," it usually happens that "the component
pieces draw in external support from their "brothers" in neighboring states."
(Zartman 1995. 4). Many claims for territory are conflicts "in which the search
for external sources of power has turned into proxy wars for distant powers."
However, while being « regionalized, exploded, proxy, and supported, »
these conflicts remain «nonetheless internal in their cause and core." (Zartman.
1995. 4).
IV. Double-Veto.
It is not easy for one party to a territorial conflict to have a definitive
military victory on the other. In case of negotiation, each party has the relative
power to « block » the resolution of the conflict. Despite the asymmetric
nature of the conflict, usually, the ultimate constructive solution depends
on the good will of the two warring parties. One might rightly think that one
way to efficiently deal with these « intractable » conflicts is to
favor or support a military victory of one side over the other--this most often
meaning "crushing" the rebellion. This is a very charming theoretical assumption.
But, in reality, military victory is generally far away from meaning an end
to the conflict. Case studies show that, «defeat of the rebellion often merely
drives the cause underground, to emerge at a later time." (Zartman 1995. 3).
The refusal to accept the double-veto reality makes of territorial claims confrontation
with "cyclical-sequence escalation." (Smoke. 1977. 27).
V. Parochiality.
Territorial claims usually come from a sentiment of relative deprivation. That
is a relative feeling of frustration, ill-treatment or injustice from the « national
state »--supposed to be acting without any discrimination. Claims for territory
are parochial mass-mobilizing contests. The claiming group develop its fight
for justice with a deep sense of group consciousness. This makes of these conflicts
struggles for which the entire circumscribed destiny of a whole community
is considered to be at stake. This parochial factor is most often dramatized
by the fact that claiming communal groups are usually--not always--ethnocentric
community. The high sense of injustice and the deep group consciousness accompanying
claims for territory lead to egocentric behaviors. The group develop a ferocious
autonomous will to increase its well-being, in terms of security, recognizance
or prosperity, independently of the possible consequences on the rest of the
state's population.
For being parochial and mainly concerning issues of faith (identity), l survival
(security) and justice (prosperity), territorial claims tend also to be emotional
conflicts with very high "levels of power and commitment." This is conducive
to irrational liberative or separatist behaviors making of parochial claims
for territory one of the conflicts in which the "testimony to man's irrational
bent" is the most obvious. Many communal groups claiming for territory are victims
of "cognitive dissonance," that is, the extraordinary "ability to maintain belief
in spite of continual, definite evidence to the contrary." (Zeigler. 1990. 378;
Festinger. 1957). The fact that there sometimes exists a huge gap between claims
and « concrete » expectations seems not to represent an obstacle to
the determination of the claiming party. This explains--in part-- "why do ethnic
groups attempt secession, even when it appears they would have much to gain
by remaining in the undivided state and much to loose by leaving it." (Horowitz.
1985. XII). In such a situation and for preventive diplomacy, it can be a dangerous
illusion to adopt a rationalistic approach to the conflict. It may be a catastrophic
error to try to explain to a communal group that its separatist claims are irrational
because the group can hardly survive as an independent state. For a communal
group victim a the cognitive dissonance syndrome, the peace broker, even "logically"
honest, will be accused of being partial and acting against the group's interest
(that is, in other words, for the state's interest).
One of the most recent instance of irrationality in a territorial claim is
the case of the island of Anjouan in the state of Comoros. Objectively speaking,
the island of Anjouan cannot economically--and even politically--survive as
a "sovereign state." Everybody-- included those paradoxically fighting for Anjouan
independence--is aware of this self-evidence. However, the cognitive dissonance
in the Anjouanese "freedom fighters" makes that the "increasingly insistent
call for separation" and the "secessionist moves on the island of Anjouan" took
a dramatic turn in September 1997. As a result, we had the incredibly surrealist
situation described by the following account from the BBC (italics are from
us):
"It all started with some flag-waving in the capital of Anjouan--one of the
four islands making up the Comorian federation […] The Comorian flags were ripped
up and burnt and replaced by flags of the old colonial power, France.
The islanders ran around with their faces painted red, white and blue [colors
of the French flag], chanting "Vive La France!" […] After some marching,
barricade-building and a bit more burning, independence was declared on
3 August [1997] and a new president, Abdallah Ibrahim, installed."[…] "But
the tiny island didn't want to be left out in the cold altogether and demanded
to be taken under France's wing once more."[…] "Perhaps the saddest irony
of all is that much as the islanders might like to belong to France again they
are simply not wanted. The French maintain, rather loftily, 'We have no intention
of acquiring any new colonies'." (BBC 1997. 6). Much more incredibly, after
the Anjouan uprising, the "demonstration effect" so familiar to territorial
claim conflict took hold of "the people across the water on the even tinier
island of Moheli." After the Anjouan's "declaration of independence," the Mohelians
"thought this [i.e. "independence"] was a very good idea and followed suit about
a week later." (BBC 1997. 6).
Below are enlisted, together with their connected effects, the five basic general
characteristics of territorial claims. These characteristics should only be
considered to be what they are, that is, "general tendencies" for a better understanding
of the nature of territorial-claim conflicts when examined independently of
contexts and circumstances. While it would sometimes be impossible to find all
the five in a given conflict, most of them are generally found in most
of territorial claims.
TABLE: Five Basic Characteristics for Territorial-Claim Conflicts with their related effects
| Characteristics | What it is about | Related Effects |
| Asymmetry | A stronger protagonist (the state) versus a weaker one | Low intensity conflicts |
| Zero-supply elasticity | The object of the conflict, the territory, can not be increase | Zero-sum prone, intractability |
| Stratification | Multilayered conflicts with a communal, a regional and an international dimensions | |
| Parochial | Communal conflicts for non inclusive (exclusive) group's interests | Ethnocentricity, egocentricity, mass-mobilization, emotionality, irrationality, relativeness, demonstrativeness ( i.e. effect of demonstration) |
| Double-vetoed | No easy sustainable solution without both sides approval | Recurrent, protracted |
Now that the issue at stake, the characteristics of the conflictual process and the characteristics of the conflict itself are known, it is easy to determine, given this basic parameters, in what conditions and contexts preventive diplomacy is effective or not.
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS: Strength and Weakness of Tactics
I. What Tactics Work and How?
Preventive diplomacy is about the transformation of conflict from violent to
non-violent expression. For territorial claims, three basic preventive tactics
are available. These are: exit, autonomy and access (Gurr 1995). One good news
for preventive diplomacy is that "all [these options] are susceptible to accommodation
by means of transforming policies and new institutional arrangements." (Gurr
1995. 5).
Since the "'exit'" option implies a complete withdrawal and total severance
of ties between the claiming communal group and the state, once the exit choice
becomes effective, the conflict--if it remains--ceases to be part of our operational
definition. That is, the issue stops being an "internal" problem and becomes
an international one between two sovereign states. For that reason, only the
last two options, i.e. "access" and "autonomy," will be taken into consideration
in this analysis.
"'Access' (not mutually exclusive) means that minority peoples individually
and collectively are guaranteed the means to pursue their cultural, political,
and material interests with the same rights (and restraints) that apply to other
groups. "Autonomy" […] means that the claiming group "acquires a collective
power base, usually a regional one, in a plural society." (Gurr 1995. 5). "Access"
is about power-sharing within a centralized political-administrative system.
"Autonomy" is about regime-building within a new context of a decentralized
political and administrative authority.
In both accommodative arrangements, the claiming party preserves its group
identity, gets guarantees for the group security and assurance concerning the
group prosperity. Constructive and sustainable accommodation requires that the
elaborated preventive tactics take into consideration two important sides of
the question: on the one hand, "public officials […] have interests [and obligation]
to protect--the most fundamental of which are (1) to maintain the state's integrity
and authority, and (2) to secure the support and revenues needed to keep their
positions and to pursue their political and programmatic objectives. How official
respond to communal demands will be conditioned by these larger interests."
(Gurr 1995. 5). On the other hand, communal leaders--if we may paraphrase professor
Gurr--, have interest and obligation to protect and promise the "Promise Land"
(or a better and bright new future) to their relatively deprived folks. How
these communal political entrepreneurs respond to the state offers, and how
they react to preventive diplomacy tactics, is conditioned by these interest
and obligation.
1. Tactics of Accommodation I: Access
Accommodation through access is an application of the Laswellian definition
of "Politics" as "who gets what, when and how." Struggles for territory are
rebellious uprisings about the enjoyment of tangible and intangible goods originated
by the exercise of political power within a state. When managing territorial
claims, communal élites are real "political entrepreneurs" interested,
not only in the well being of "their" people, but also in their personal political
destiny. Consequently, "access" to the political system means, not only guarantees
and means for communal groups "to pursue their cultural, political, and material
interests with the same rights (and restraints) that apply to other groups,"
but also, the integration of the communal group's leaders (at high and most
often strategic or symbolic positions) within the governing body of the state.
A. Access Through Elite Integration: Power-Sharing
This tactic tacitly supposes that communal political leaders are also--maybe
most of all--"political entrepreneurs." Their "investment" in the group's claims
is justified not only by more or less genuine "nationalist" sentiments, but
also by personal political ambition. Taking into consideration this personal
equation of communal leaders, preventive diplomacy applies the power-sharing
tactics by defusing violence through an infusion of (political) power within
the claiming group thanks to a dynamic integration of its leaders into the governing
machine.
This tactics has at least two powerful therapeutic effects:
It neutralizes the will to mobilize of the integrated communal "leader " now
happy enough to enjoy its "rente de situation" within the state's governing
body. Communal leaders have an enormous power to mobilize, influence, or orient
communal public opinion and behavior. Consequently the using of the "tactic
de rente" supposes that by giving leaders a "rente" these leaders
will appease "their" people.
The access of "one of theirs" into the political system gives the communal
group the sentiment that it, too, "got the power" and really "governs" the state.
This representative symbolic satisfaction defuse violence instinct.
Let us mention that the access tactic is more or less an application of the
"grand coalition" hypothesis of the consociational model. This latter states
that, "the primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political
leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand
coalition to govern the country." (Lijphart in Horowitz 1985. 574-575). Some
theoreticians of consociationalism (Lijphart 1977), observing that some plural
societies (Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc.) live in peace
and remain stable "in spite of considerable heterogeneity," attribute the merit
of this peaceful stability to the establishment of a balanced power-sharing
system in the form of "grand coalitions" in which "cooperation by the leaders
of different group […] transcends the segmental and subcultural cleavages."
(Horowitz 1985. 571). Consociationalism is essentially about balanced power-sharing.
That is, "an alternative way of ordering multi-communal societies" in a political
context where it is assumed that "communal identities and organizations are
the basic elements or pillars of society." In such a situation, "state power
is exercised jointly by the constituent communities, each of which is proportionally
represented in government." Besides, the governing communal groups "have mutual
veto-power." (Gurr 1995. 25). In Africa, Cameroon is one marvelous example of
the use of consociationalism as a power-sharing tactic (with no veto-power for
all the governing factions).
The elite integration tactic was also successfully used in South Africa to
cool down the Kwazulu-Natal claims for "independence" or "autonomy." The Inkhata
Freedom Party (IFP)'s leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi used its leadership
position and skills in order to maximize its "access" within the new democratic
South African regime governed by its arch-political rival the ANC. As a matter
of fact, in 1995 the IFP quitted the Constitutive Assembly and undertook to
write a "regional constitution" for the Kwazulu-Natal. This constitution aimed
at a special statute for the Kwazulu-Natal within a federal South-Africa. This
behavior was potentially disruptive for the peace process in South Africa. The
stake was a high one for Buthelezi: with the end of both the Cold War and the
Apartheid, Buthelezi was poised to stop being a determinant political actor
in the South African scene. He was about to be banalized as a leader. And he
did not want to be integrated in the new political environment as a "banal"
South African political personality. Consequently, he needed to higher the stakes
by "blackmailing" the Constitutive Conference with its separatist ambition.
To alleviate "the frustrations of Mangosuthu Buthelezi," (Balencie I. 1996.
500-501), he was given a "rente de situation". He was integrated in
the new South African government in a high position (Minister of Interior).
Two conditions are needed for the access tactic through a "rente de situation" to fully be effective:
The integrated elite needs to be really representative. He needs to be an "authentic
daughter or son" of the communal group. That is a leader the group respects,
honors and somehow even venerates. This was the case in 1961 in Cameroon. The
two English speaking parts of Cameroon, the Northern part and the Southern one
(all of them in the Western part of the country, bordering the frontier with
Nigeria) were given the choice, through a referendum, to join Nigeria or to
remain with the Republic of Cameroon. The Northern part chose to join Nigeria.
And the Southern part, through its paramount leader John Ngu Foncha decided
to remain in Cameroon. After that choice, Cameroon became a bilingual Federal
Republic with a French speaking and an English speaking part. John Ngu Foncha,
as well as many Anglophone élites, were integrated in a high
position in Cameroonian federal government;
The second condition, a manifestation of the first, is a need for group
cohesion. The group should recognizes itself in the ideals and ambitions
of the leader and the leader should be in phase with the aspirations of the
group--when he does not inspire or create these aspirations. In a situation
where there is no comprehensive recognition of the leadership of the integrated
elite and no comprehensive communion at the level of the ideals and ambitions
of the claiming group, elite integration can still work. But two more conditions
should be fulfilled: (1) the veto-power of the fighting faction within the communal
group should be soft enough to oblige this faction to seek an agreement (at
any necessary cost) with the government, and (2) the fighting faction must be
"meaningless" enough so that its decision--through its leader--to join the government
or to continue fighting remains with no determinant impact on the attitude and
perceptions on the remaining faction (that is, the non fighting one) of the
communal group. This hypothesis is better understood when analyzing the situation
of the Inkhata Freedom Party and its leader Buthelezi within the South African
scene during the transition from Apartheid to democracy. The Zoulous are about
8 million people in South Africa. That is 22% of the population. Within these
8 million, the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) claims 2 million members. That is
just 25% of the Zulu (the real percentage is probably less than that). This
means that at least 75% of the Zulus do not recognize the IFP (and its leader)'s
ideals, interest and ambitions as theirs. More, in the 1994 elections, the IFP
obtained only 9.1% of favorable votes at the national level (let's remember
that the Zulus represent 22% of the total South African population). Even in
the Kwazulu-Natal, its traditional "fief", the IFP obtained only 50.32% of favorable
votes. On the other hand nevertheless, Chief Buthelezi is obeyed, respected
and veneered by the (small) fighting faction of the Zulu community. In such
a situation, it is easier to defuse violence by integrating Buthelezi in the
Government than if he were a paramount war lord of the 100% Zulus of South Africa,
or if his authority within the IFP was shaken by serious rebellious branches.
Access through elite integration can also be collective. That is, instead of
giving access to one paramount leader in the government, there is a policy of
mass recruitment of members of the claiming group. In Canada, following adequate
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (established
in 1963) which aimed at "equal partnership" and "institutional bilingualism,"
French-speaking Canadians "became better represented than formerly within the
higher levels of the bureaucracy." (Glazer 1975. 271). In the Canadian situation,
"the Québecois have not been [fully] satisfied by the Canadian federal
government's policies of accommodation." However, while they remain determined
to acquire full sovereignty, (Gurr 1993. 159), violence has been greatly defused.
B. Access Through Norm Integration: Regime-Building
At this level, the labor of violence-prevention consists in hammering out constitutional
arrangements that give the communal group guarantees and certainty that its
identity, its security and its property will be fully and equally assured within
the context of a plural state. In post-Apartheid South Africa, to appease the
Inkhata Freedom Party was not only an issue about giving access to its leader
in the government, but also a matter of integrating in the South African constitution
specific norms that guarantee the preservation and promotion of the Zulu identity
and freedom of expression and peaceful affirmation. On the other hand, the genuinely
democratic character of the South African constitution made the Freedom Front
or the Conservative Party (both of which fight for the South African "White
tribe"'s identity) to express "peacefully and legally their claims in the context
of a parliamentary regime." (Balencie I. 1996. 502).
Since separatist aspirations are generally orchestrated by the fear of being relatively maltreated or oppressed for the sake of one's communal identity, regime-building, through constitutional arrangements is a good point for preventive action. A good constitution is an effective peacebuilding instrument for it recognizes and constitutionally reaffirms these basic "self-evident truths": all human beings "are created equal […] they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights [among which] are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." (U.S. Declaration of Independence). Constitutional recognition of plurality in unity canalizes claims from their physical violent expression to their verbal or rhetorical peaceful enunciation.
The norms integration tactic also explains why, in democracy, territorial claims
are less likely to degenerate into chaotic merciless violence. Even when there
is violence outbreak, the situation is rapidly and fully mastered as shown by
the examples of Québec in Canada, Brittany in France or South-Tyrol in
Italy.
2. Tactics of Accommodation II: The use of "Sweeteners"
A second tactic of accommodation consists in "being sweet" with the communal
group. Two options are available: (1) the "recognition" or "glorification" of
the communal group's identity and (2) the promotion of its prosperity.
A. The glorification of identity
Claims for identity recognition or glorification are intensely polarizing issues.
Consequently, to prevent violence through constructive manipulation of identity
becomes a very delicate operation. The preventing process in such a situation
should start with answering to this fundamental question: what is it all
about? This was the demarche adopted by the Canadian government in 1963
when it established a "Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism" (Glazer1975.
268) in order to "get the point." Among many other measures elaborated by this
Commission were the recommendations "for 'equal partnership' and 'institutional
bilingualism'." Consequently "the federal government embarked on a series of
policies to improve the position of the French and the French language in
those agencies and institutions within its jurisdiction. Bilingualism within
the public service improved [and] Ottawa began slowly taking on the aspect of
a bilingual national capital." (Glazer 1975. 271). This "glorification" of the
French language greatly defused the belligeneous tension existing between the
Canadian government and its French-speaking citizens.
The same tactic was used by the French government vis-à-vis Brittany.
The Recognition and glorification of the "national culture and identity" of
the Bretons was preventively used to contain or prevent violence in Brittany
where, since 1898, "cultural and economic differences are the root of ethnonationalism."
The Bretons in France have "their distinct Celtic language and customs." These
"language and customs had gradually eroded under pressure from the Paris government,
which since the 1880s had required that the French be taught in the public school
system." Consequently, the "Front pour la Libération de Bretagne
(FLB) […] demanded 'decolonization' and carried out sustained campaigns
of bombings against property targets from 1966 to 1979." (Gurr 1993. 156). In
the seventies, the French government undertook a seducing "promotion of the
Breton language." And, at "the beginning of the eighties, the French government
"adopted policies that aimed at 'a flowering of regional languages and cultures'"
(Gurr 1993. 155-156). This contained, and finally eradicated violence in the
region. In Sudan, "in June 1969 […] a new military government recognized the
'historical and cultural differences between the north and south' and proposed
'regional autonomy within a united Sudan'." Thanks to this tactic, violence
was gradually defused and the process "culminated in the Addis-Ababa Accord
of February 1972 which established the south as one large region with substantial
internal self-rule."(Smock 1993. 81). An end was thus put to a bloody and merciless
seventeen-year civil war. In Italy, "the three hundred thousand German speakers
of the northern Italian region of South Tyrol [were granted] an autonomy statute
in 1948" with guarantee for "for preservation of [their] German cultural identity."
(Gurr 1993. 157). Once more, violence was prevented (for a while).
B. Promotion of prosperity
Since the relative deprivation factor is a determinant element in the outbreak
and escalation of violence in territorial claims, economic measures aiming at
"balancing" the "unjust" situation are important. The prosperity-building tactic
consists in favorably discriminating the claiming region for economic and social
development investments. In Brittany (France), "central government policies
since the late 1940s have been to promote regional economic development." As
a result, by "the early 1990s the economic gap between Brittany and the center
had closed and the more extreme manifestation of Breton nationalism had
vanished." (Gurr 1993. 156). On the contrary in South Tyrol, the above-mentioned
recognition of cultural identity was not followed by the "correction" of economic
and political "unjust situations." In fact, "political and economic affairs
[were left] in the hands of the Italian majority in the larger Trentino-Alto
Adige region." Moreover, "continued Italian immigration into the towns of South
Tyrol further angered the German-speaking population" for it aggravated the
existing economic imbalance (Gurr 1993. 158). This ambiguous state of things
"led in the 1950s to appeals for greater autonomy by the South Tyroleans." Violence
escalation followed with a "terrorist campaign […] which peaked in the early
1960s." The Italian government constructively reacted with "a major overhaul
of the 1948 statute." Consequently, "since implementation of the new autonomy
pact, beginning in 1972, the German minority has gained effective control of
public administration, educational and cultural affairs." More importantly,
"economic development in South Tyrol [is] financed by a percentage of government
spending in relevant sectors. A quota system gives preference in hiring to German
speakers in public and quasi-public sectors." The positive discrimination tactic
is so successful that it has made of South Tyrol "one of the most prosperous
Italian regions." ( Gurr 1993. 158).
A determinant question for preventive action through discriminatory prosperity building is: how far can the government go in its politics of positive discrimination without provoking the ire of the other communities or regions? The situation in South Tyrol shows that such preventive initiatives should be, not only carefully thought, but thoroughly balanced in a context of limited states' resources and unlimited human wants. The positive discrimination politics in South Tyrol may, in more or less longer term, become victim of its success. A "serious issue is the resentment of the region's Italian minority over preferential treatment being given to the ethnic Germans." This "conservative reaction to concessions for [German-speaking] minorities" is, for the time being, expressed in "electoral support for a neo-Fascist party" in the region. (Gurr 1993. 158).
3. Tactics of Accommodation III: Autonomy
Another way to prevent violence or contain its escalation in situations of territorial claim is to grant autonomy to the claiming party. Autonomy is a middle-ground solution between "exit" and "access." That is, between integration and secession. "Autonomy means that a minority acquires a collective power base, usually a regional one, in a plural society." (Gurr 1995. 5). The autonomy solution gives a parochial home to the communal group within the comprehensive universe of a plural state. Autonomy gives the communal group the conviction that, enjoying (at last) the pleasant safety of a "fatherland", its identity will be fully respected, as well as its prosperity entirely assured. As a tactic to defuse violence, autonomy was used in 1980 in Spain for the Basques, in Nicaragua in 1990 for the Miskita, in India in 1972 for the Naga and Tripura. Part of the Moros region in Philippines was granted autonomy in 1990. (Gurr 1995. 8).
The basic problem with an autonomy regime is to strike the right balance between
the comprehensive rights and prerogatives of the state and the political power
and administrative competence devolved to the autonomous region. If issues of
national defense, finance and foreign affairs do not constitute subjects for
controversies, problems arise when it comes to define who does what and how
in the sphere of social and economic development. Sometimes--or, usually--it
takes more than one "stroke of pen" to design the needed right balance. In South
Tyrol, three "autonomy pacts" were built within a period of 40 years (1948,
1972 and 1988). Till, the "Ein Tyro separatists" are a long way to fully be
"satisfied." (Gurr 1993. 159). In Soudan, the 1972 agreement ran amok after
11 years of a profoundly uncertain equilibrium. In the Basque region, violence
is going on despite an autonomy regime.
When considering the above-mentioned tactics of accommodation, a general question
comes in mind: why, in some cases of territorial claim, preventive action is
effective, and why, in some others, it is not?
There seems to be a tight correlation between the nature of the political regime
(democratic or non-democratic) and the outcome of the claim: historical records
tend to show that authoritarian regimes are not prone to accommodation. For
these non-democratic regimes, "iconoclastic" claims for territory (as any other
case of civil insubordination) constitute a direct challenge to the personal
authority of the "Head of the State." In such a polarizing context conflict
management is reduced to the eradication (at any cost) of the opposition and
preventive diplomacy nearly becomes powerless. The Ibos were crushed in Nigeria
in the 1960s, the Baganda got the same tragic fate in Uganda, as well as the
Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the Tamil in Sri Lanka, various nationalities
in the former Soviet Union, and the Timorese in Indonesia. A contrario,
"in the last two decades, virtually all the politically-assertive communal minorities
in Western democracies have managed to make some gains in response to their
political demands. These [democratic] states have devised strategies of accommodation
that have contributed to a substantial decline in political protest and violence
on behalf of communal interest. Among the specific reforms are guarantees of
full civil and political rights […]." (Gurr 1995. 1). A general conclusion one
may draw from this is that, preventive diplomacy through elite-integration,
norm-integration and regime-building is more effective in liberal democratic
states--that is, "participatory and responsive political" government (Gurr 1993.
137)--than in monolithic authoritarian states. This hypothesis is corroborated
by the cases of the Bretons in France, the South-Tyroleans in Italy or the French-speaking
Canadian in Canada. We can even affirm that a democratic regime is psychologically
prepared to accept the reality of secession if ever it becomes inevitable. In
Canada, a political context where the Québecois seem to absolutely be
heading toward full sovereignty, an "Anglo-American official" says: "Quebec's
secession would be like amputating an arm--painful but Canada could live without
it." (Gurr 1993. 295). Such a psychology of fatal resignation is hardly found
in authoritarian states. Moreover, in a situation authoritarian governance,
the absence of institutional channels of dialogue makes the issue much more
passionate and emotional. All characteristics that give hard times to preventive
action.
4. The Case for Ripeness I: On Ripening Attitudes and Rhetoric
It is a hard task--nearly an impossible one for some--to define at what moment
exactly a conflict is ripe for resolution (Zartman 1989). It is however
possible to "guess" what kind of rhetoric and/or attitudes might lead a conflictual
situation to the ripening point. A study of the "discursive structures" of conflict
shows that as long as the protagonists remains entrapped within abrasive "rigidifying
interpretations of the dispute" (Auvinen & Kivimäki 1997. 11) there
is little hope for preventive diplomacy to be effective. On the contrary, a
rhetoric of appeasement and détente carries the conflict to a ripening
zone. Concerning for instance the conflict in the Middle East, the 1993
"Miracle of Peace" (Time. September 20, 1993) was, for a large part,
possible thanks to the fact that the two parties adopted a rhetoric of appeasement--in
part under the pressure of a robust honest peacebroker: the USA--in order to
give a chance to the peace negotiations. For Israel, the PLO was officially
recognized as a honorable partner (instead of being perceived as a "terrorist
organization") and the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Before
that, the PLO's Chief, M. Yasser Arafat, wrote an unprecendently accommodating
letter to the Israeli Prime Minister. An "archeology" of this letter's words
and phrases reveals the existence of number of ripening rhetorical propositions:
(1) the Chief of the PLO announces to the Prime Minister of Israel that the
PLO officially recognizes the right for Israel to exist and live in peace and
security; (2) he declares to be, from now on, for a peaceful negotiation of
the conflict; (3) he affirms to be against terrorism and promises to use his
authority to prevent the use of violence by Palestinians; (4) the articles of
Palestinian Charter not recognizing the right for Israel to exist are officially
declared null and void. (quoted in Corm 1997. 128-132). These reciprocal preliminary
ripening attitudes and rhetoric were one of the basic factors that made the
Oslo Agreements possible.
5. The Case for Ripeness II: On Defreezing Circumstances and Contexts
Just as rhetoric and attitudes, there are ripening circumstances and contexts,
which make easier the task for preventive diplomacy. In a situation of territorial
claim, changes in the state's government or in the rebellion's leadership can
blow a "wind of hope" on the conflict. This happened during the June 1992 legislative
elections in Israel. The confrontationist "hawks" from the Likoud were defeated
by the much more accommodative "doves" from the Labor party. This vote sanctioned
"the immobilism of the Likoud and gave to the Labor Party the opportunity to
accelerate the peace process and, therefore, to reduce the level of violence."
(Corm 1997. 125). Once more, the Oslo Agreements were the outcome. In Sri Lanka,
the August 1994 legislative elections took to power the "Popular Alliance."
Three months later, the leader of this party, Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga, was
elected President of the Republic. The accommodative and appeasing behavior
of this new governmental team established "new conditions likely to unblock
the situation." And in fact, two months after the election of Ms Kumaratunga
(January 1995), a cease-fire agreement was signed between the government and
the LTTE rebellion (Meyer 1996, 38).
II. Why Preventive Diplomacy Does Not Work and How?
Claims for territory are notoriously complicated conflicts. They are double-vetoed conflicts for which negotiation appears to be the best option « not because it is such a good solution but because all the other are so bad. » (Clark. 1995. 62). For, they contain all the flaws of civil wars and nearly none of their "qualities"--at least as far as conflict negotiation and preventive diplomacy are concerned--territorial claims are among the worst of civil wars. They are highly intractable conflicts, they are generally protracted confrontations and merciless "wars without front." Besides, they are permeable to outside intervention. This explosive combination of factors makes of these conflicts probably among the worst preventive diplomacy has to deal with.
In the following paragraphs, we examine the main factors of weakness for preventive
diplomacy in situations of territorial claims. Through this examination of what
does not work, we should be able to « read » and understand the conditions
for effectiveness for the task of violence prevention and violence containment.
The structural complexification
The first fundamental obstacle for preventive diplomacy in a situation of territorial
claim is what we name the structural complexification of the conflict.
That is, this perverse tendency territorial claims have to compound more than
one of the above-mentioned five characteristics--and their connected effects--within
the context of a single conflict. Facing a structurally complexified conflict,
preventive diplomacy will have to deal, not only with each of these characteristics
individually considered, but also with any combination of at least two of them.
This structural complexification of territorial claim makes of these conflicts
very specific confrontations to be handle with specifically relevant tactics.
Timing appears to be particularly determinant for any preventive action at this
level: early engagement, when power and commitment are still low and the complexification
process is still at is beginning, is the "right way to do the right thing at
the right time."
Conflict stratification
Many territorial conflicts are « stratified conflicts. » That is, conflicts with more than one geopolitical dimension. Most often, to the purely communal dimension of the claim are added one or two more layers related to a regional "structural rivalry" or a global struggle for power (this latter dimension was much encountered during the Cold War). The Western Saharan conflict is one of the typical instance of a stratified conflict with a determinant regional dimension (Algeria-Morocco rivalry). As noted by William Zartman, "the Saharan conflict [is] deep-seated and multilayered […] By the end of 1984, the Saharan conflict had lost its specific focus on a piece of land and had become a clash of alliances in the Maghrib » leading to an « escalation of the conflict to the level of political alliances » in the subregion. (Zartman. 1989. 70 & 61). Because of this stratification, it appears to be a mere illusion to try to prevent--or contain--violence in the Western Saharan conflict without taking into consideration the "structural rivalry" opposing Algeria to Morocco. The same observation is valid for the Northern Ireland conflict for which effectiveness for any violence prevention initiative is conditioned by the quality (good or bad) of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In Sri Lanka, the "separatist war conducted by the militants of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam] […] is amplified by the strained relations between India and Sri Lanka." (Meyer 1996, 38; Maitra 1995, 36-37). The civil war in Sudan "had invited significant external involvement from neighboring African states, protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the superpowers." (Smock 1993. 81).
As far as the "third layer"--i.e. the international dimension--is considered conflict in the Middle East offers an example in which, during the Cold War, any peace initiative, to be effective, had to take into consideration the state of the "U.S.-Soviet relations."(Stein. 1991. 9).
In such an environment, what kind of tactics guarantee preventive diplomacy
effectiveness?
The first tactic consists in giving its « right weight » to each layer of the conflict. No layer should be neglected or put into parentheses in the search for constructive and sustainable solutions. For, it is an illusion--and sometimes a dangerous one--to try to prevent or contain violence at, for instance, the communal level, without taking into consideration the regional rivalry for power within the second layer or the international global confrontation for hegemony within the third layer. This aspect of the question is clearly mentioned by President Clinton when he observes that « the resumption of dialogue between the Irish and the British governments" is a "critical precondition to any establishment of a lasting peace" in Northern Ireland (Conor O'Clery. 1997. 48).
Equally, it is an illusion to try to prevent or contain violence uniquely through
an amelioration of power relations at the regional or the international levels,
without taking into consideration the grassroots or the communal level. One
thing is sure: despite the determinant impact on the conflict outcome of the
"external sources of power," the communal dimension keeps a certain level of
autonomy. This substantial degree of autonomy makes it difficult to perceive
the confrontation just as a proxy war remotely-controlled by external "masters"
or "Big Brother." For instance, it remains true that in Cyprus, there is no
way a lasting constructive solution to the conflict can be found without taking
into consideration the desiderata of Cyprus' two neighbors: Turkey
and Greece. Nevertheless on the other hand; it is an illusion to think that
a "gentlemen agreement" between Turkey and Greece may lead to a lasting peace
in Cyprus. In the 1950s and 1960s peace initiatives in Cyprus failed to contain
violence « because they were insufficiently attentive to the intercommunal
dimensions of the conflict and each community security's interests. » These
first peace initiatives « centered on finding a settlement that would be
acceptable to Greece and Turkey, even at the expense of the interests of the
two Cypriot communities. One of the principal reasons the London-Zurich Accords
and the subsequent Constitutional Accord failed was that the settlement was
imposed on the two ethnic Cypriot communities. » An interesting fact, and
one of the determinant lessons for preventive diplomacy in this case is that,
because the «compound nature » of the conflict was not adequately taken
into consideration, not only efforts to prevent violence outbreak and violence
escalation failed, but also, the whole process--though based on good intentions--produced
reverse results. That is, "third party-efforts contributed to the escalation
of the conflict by failing to strike the right balance in negotiations and the
subsequent "settlement" between regional and intercommunal interests in Cyprus."
(Hampson. 1996. 48-49).
3. Front Dislocation
Any peace process includes two fronts: (1) the war-fighting front, made of
the conflicting protagonists, and the peace-seeking front, made of the peace-broker(s)--"front
de la paix" or "faiseurs de paix" (Corm 1997. 8 & 125). Effectiveness
in violence prevention or containment--as well as conflict management at large--requires
that these different fronts remain, respectively, unified. An ideal situation
for a peace initiative is the one with only three agendas: the fighting parties'
(two) agendas and the peace-broker(s)'s one.
We call « front dislocation » a situation in which the fighting front
stop being « homogenous » (a guerilla splitting into at least two
rival branches), or the peace-brokering front (in the case of a multilateral
initiative) stops following the same common path. In such a situation where
there does exist more than two fighting parties in the battlefield, there is
a multiplication of agendas, stakes and commitments. This complicates furthermore
the conflict, and, by the same token, it automatically makes much more complicated
the task for preventive diplomacy.
It also happens sometimes that the peace-brokers' front falls apart. The outcome is the same. Preventive diplomacy automatically becomes much more ineffective for, those who speaks in the name of peace do no longer speak the same language. This situation happened at the beginning of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and led to what Richard H. Ullman calls the "European fiasco" in the Yugoslavian crisis (Ullman. 1996. 109). The dislocation of the peace-brokers' front was about "the problem of recognition" which deeply divided the European mediators. Ullman notes: in its attempt to prevent violence outbreak in Yugoslavia, "recognition is certainly one of the messiest aspect of the EC [i.e. European Community]'s action." From July 1991 on, the 12 member nations were split--Germany and Italy (as well as Austria, a candidate for EC member) argued for prompt recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, which were seen as exercising their right to self-determination; the United States, the UN secretary-general, and his envoy, Cyrus Vance, supported the position of the Dutch foreign minister, the French, the British, and Lord Carrington against immediate recognition." (Ullman, 105). As a result, preventive diplomacy was unable to be effective. Violence was not contained and Yugoslavia was transformed into a huge nightmare for Europe and the international community. Later, after Yugoslavia had become a "casse-tête" for the international community, another strategy for violence prevention divided the "peace front" and threatened to render nil the ongoing preventive diplomacy efforts: the question of arms embargo (Bosnia) divided for a long time Europe and the United States (Mission Permanente de la France auprès des Nations Unies 1995. 2-4).
In conclusion, it is highly complicated for preventive diplomacy to deal with
a continuously splitting war-fighting front. And, as shown by the failure of
early attempts to prevent violence in Yugoslavia, there is no hope for preventive
action if the peace-broker front does not remain within a commonly shared logic
of action.
In dealing with the war-fighting front, one tactics might be to take into consideration
only the « determinant actors » in the field and ignore or eliminate
the others. That is, to « discover which factions within a rebellion favor
a settlement [and grant them official recognition] and which do not [and put
them in « quarantine »] » (Clark. 1995. 61.). This does not seem
to be an efficient solution for, (1) it is sometimes difficult to clearly determine
which actor is « determinant » and which one is not, and (2) even
« small » actors with no negotiation power continues to have high
"capacité de nuisance" which can badly hurts the whole peace effort.
4. Spineless Initiatives
In many cases of territorial claims, there is no hope for success without the backing of the peace effort by a robust honest peace broker. Robustness is for preventive diplomacy what vitamins are for the body. It gives it strength and better health. It makes it work and work efficiently. Another reason of the "European fiasco" in the former Yugoslavia is that "the OSCE [...] is too unwieldy an organization to be either an effective diplomatic agent or a force for collective security." (Ullman 1996. 109; Hoffmann. 1995). This explains "the relatively modest role played by the OSCE in the Yugoslavia crisis." "The major powers among its members, both European and non-European, have not shown enough enthusiasm for boosting its role to provide such an incentive to anyone." (Ullman, 110). The observation is even more pertinent concerning the OUA's action in the Western Saharan Conflict or, in a certain degree, the United Nations in Cyprus. On the contrary, one can remark that the peace process in Western Sahara is gaining a new impetus since the nomination of M. James Baker, an American citizen, as the special representative of the United Nations Secretariat general to the Western Sahara (Aguirre 1997). It is unanimously recognized today that, in the Middle East crisis, a conflict with innumerable recurrent hot phases of violence escalation, a "vigorous and continuous participation by the United States at the highest government level is essential for progress." (Stein 1991. 16).
5. The "Tyranny" of Words: Constructive and Deconstructive Rhetoric
In diplomacy in general, and in the diplomacy of conflict management in particular,
the way words are said, the way phrases are framed and propositions enunciated,
determine for a large part the way words are understood, how phrases are interpreted
and propositions adopted or rejected. In the diplomacy of conflict, words exercise
a real « tyrannical » power over peacebrokers. Constructive rhetorical
rules of this « tyrannical regime » should absolutely be understood
and accepted for the sake of efficiency in action. A close examination of the
function and impact of words and phrases used in the diplomacy of conflict shows
that, independently of the ultimate aim of the peacebroker--which is violence
prevention or peacemaking--rhetoric can be escalative/abrasive or,
on the contrary, a factor of appeasement and "détente." When taking into
consideration the "aesthetic" of words in diplomacy, preventive diplomacy can
be defined as the art of using the rhetoric of appeasement and détente
for the sake of violence prevention or violence containment in a situation of
an open conflict.
The first thing to be understood when choosing words and framing phrases is
that preventive diplomacy--at least as understood in this study--is really not
about conflict resolution. Preventive diplomacy makes the bed for conflict resolution
by containing violence outbreak or violence escalation, so that conflict can
be managed and resolved in a safe, less tense, less polarized and more politically
enabling environment.
The enlargement of preventive diplomacy agenda beyond its legitimate "territorial"
borders carries with it ignitive confusion.
Non compliance with the tyranny of words in preventive diplomacy creates confusion
of roles and ambitions. This unfortunate « rebellion » against the
tyranny of words usually leads to one of the most perverse mistake preventive
diplomats usually commit: in their recommendations does generally appear the
tendency to slide from the language of violence prevention to a rhetoric of
conflict resolution. This unfortunate--and illegitimate--enlargement of preventive
diplomacy ambition can have dangerous effects in a situation of an open conflict
with high « levels of power and commitment » and deep misunderstanding
and distrust. When, in the midst of cumulative violence escalation, passions,
ambitions and contradictory and mutually exclusive extremist senses of being
right are still high and « hot », preventive diplomacy should exclusively
focus on its object. That is: « violence de-escalation» for a better environment
for conflict negotiation. Any sideslipping to a conflict resolution rhetoric
would, explicitly or implicitly, leads to determine--that is, to judge--"who
is right" and "who is wrong,", "what is right" and "what is wrong." In such
a situation, there is a high probability that at least one of the protagonist
will consider to be "betrayed" and will "renegade." The peacebroker will automatically
be discredited and delegitimized (Ahmedou Ould Abdallah 1996).
One obvious example in which preventive diplomacy language skids into an abrasive
rhetoric of conflict resolution is the OAU's efforts to prevent violence in
the Western Sahara conflict. As a matter of fact, « the mistake of the
[OAU] Committee [of Wisemen in charge to contain violence in Western Sahara]
lays in its charge to adjudicate rather than to mediate the conflict. »
In its first part, the report of this Committee « called for a cease-fire.»
This was in conformity with its preventive diplomacy mission. The rhetorical
mistake came when the same report called for « an exercise of self-determination
in the Western Sahara and ordered a referendum. » By calling for « an
exercise of self-determination » for the Saharawi, that is, by dictating
a solution to a situation in which it was only supposed to contain violence
and create an enabling political environment for conflict resolution. The Committee
delegitimized itself in the eyes of one of the protagonist (Morocco). It was
then not a surprise that the king of Morocco, Hassan, « reneged. »
(Zartman. 1989.55).
Contrary to the case of the OAU in Western Sahara, an example in which a strict
compliance to the « tyranny of words » helped for positive and constructive
sustainable steps in preventive diplomacy is the U.S. preventive engagement
in the Middle-East crisis (Stein & Lewis. 1991).
In conclusion, a close examination of stakes, attitudes, and tactics for preventive diplomacy in situations of territorial claims makes it clear that these confrontations are highly complicated conflicts for which preventive action remains, for a large part, unarmed. Even for apparently success stories like Quebec in Canada, South-Tyrol in Italy or Belgium, a tireless recurrent cycle of verbal or physical violence in these areas constantly reminds us that, for cases of territorial claims, nothing should be taken for definitely won for preventive diplomacy until, after a (very) long time the divisive power of parochial memory is defeated by the human wisdom of objective reason.ANNEXE
TABLE: Outcomes of Ethnonationalist Wars for Independence or Autonomy, 1944-1991
| Group | Countries | Period of open conflict | Status in 1992 |
| Conflicts Leading to Accommodation |
| Lithuanians | USSR | 1945-1952 | Independent 1991 |
| Ukrainians | USSR | 1944-mid 1950s | Independent 1992 |
| Eritreans | Ethiopia | 1961-1991 | Independent 19… |
| Tigreans | Ethiopia | 1963-1991 | ……… |
| Somali | Ethiopia | 1963-1991 | ………. |
| Basques | Spain | 1959-late 1980s | Regional autonomy 1980 |
| Miskita | Nicaragua | 1981-1988 | Regional autonomy 1990 |
| Nagas | India | 1952-1975 | Regional autonomy 1972 |
| Tripura | India | 1967-1989 | Regional autonomy 1972. Sporadic conflict. |
| Chittagong
Hill Peoples |
Bangladesh | 1975-1989 | District Councils with limited autonomy 1989 |
| Moros | Philippines | 1972-1976 | Autonomy for part of region 1990 |
| Baluchs | Pakistan | 1973-1977 | 3 Partially restored 1980 |
| Kurds | Turkey | 1961-present | Political recognition - Conflict abating |
| Saharawis | Morocco | 1973-1990 | UN referendum 1992 - Intermittent conflict |
| Conflicts Leading to Protracted Negotiations |
| Catholics | N. Ireland | 1969-present | Intermittent negotiations on power-sharing - conflict abating |
| Kurds | Iraq | 1960-present | Negotiations in progress. Intermittent conflict |
| Palestinians | West Bank and Ghaza | 1968-Present | Negotiations in progress-conflict continues |
| Conflict Suppressed without Significant Accommodation |
| Ibo | Nigeria | 1967-1970 | Conflict suppressed, reincorporated in state |
| Kurds | Iran | 1945-late 1980s | Conflict suppressed |
| Palestinians | Lebanon | 1965-1990 | Conflict suppressed by Syrian intervention |
| Tibetans | China | 1959-1989 | Conflict suppressed |
| Timorese | Indonesia | 1974-late 1980s | Conflict suppressed |
| Papuans | Indonesia | 1964-1986 | Conflict suppressed |
| Karen | Burma | 1945-present | Defeat imminent |
| Conflicts Persisting or Escalating |
| Tamils | Sri Lanka | 1975-present | Regional autonomy 1987. Conflict continues |
| Sikhs | India | 1978-present | Regional autonomy 1966. Conflict escalating. |
| Southerners | Sudan | 1955-1972
1983-present |
Autonomy 1972-1983
Conflict continues |
| Kachins | Burma | 1961-present | Conflict |
| Shan | Burma | 1962-present | Conflict continues |
Slightly modified table from Ted Robert Gurr, "Transforming Ethno-political Conflicts: Exit, Autonomy, or Access?" in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.). 1995. Conflict Transformation (New York: St. Martin's Press).
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1. Ted Robert Gurr does not agree with this pattern of thought: "it is a mistake to regard ethno-political conflicts as intrinsically zero- or negative-sum." (Gurr 1985.3).
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