Chapter 2

Boundary Conflicts and Preventive Diplomacy

Kjell-Åke Nordquist

Several international conventions formulated during this century, from the UN Charter to regional international documents, stipulate directly or indirectly that changes of inter-state boundaries are acceptable only through peaceful means. But crisis situations where boundaries or boundary-related issues are at stake are frequent in the international system. Some boundary problems are settled before they escalate into serious crises. Others seem irreconcilable and involve frequent military exchanges. Regulated or not, boundary and border relations will remain a potential source of conflict in the international system of states for the foreseeable future. New states are established, the Cold War kept many unsatisfactory solutions alive, and the penetration of states into neighboring border areas, not the least for economic purposes, has increased. Such developments put boundaries on the agenda in international relations.

Boundaries are interesting phenomena. They bring states together whether they want it or not. States with a common boundary share at least a minimum degree of "relation," and cannot claim to be able to totally ignore each other. In fact, boundaries create a prima facie hostile situation, since "my neighbor is my enemy".⁽¹⁾

Boundaries are by definition shared. They define a state territorially and provide in this way a condition for state sovereignty, yet their very nature as relational is an infringement upon the same sovereignty. Thus, a boundary can be a potential mirror of internal disputes as well as a root of an interstate dispute in itself. Another aspect, adding to the intricacy of boundary relations, is that they are based both on internal and international legislation: a boundary agreement is an international legal document, even if its making and ratification is exclusively internal political processes.

Together with the characteristics mentioned above, a boundary crisis almost necessarily constitutes a complicated mix of interests, actors and actions. In the following, this mix of interests and actions related to boundary problems will be analyzed from a perspective of conflict prevention. This chapter draws conclusions from experiences of preventive diplomatic measures undertaken at various levels of boundary conflicts. It is the prevention of the escalation through successful initiatives toward de-escalation that is the main problem here. In brief and generally the question is: when and how do preventive diplomatic measures through negotiation make boundary conflicts de-escalate?

1.1 Defining boundary conflict

Boundary is here used as referring to the line separating two states, irrespective of its degree of implementation (i.e. delimitation or definition on paper, and demarcation or marking on the ground). Borders refers to the area surrounding a boundary, and frontier is the area where two states meet in interests and penetration, while not necessarily with an agreed territorial limit for their aspirations.

A boundary conflict is over a boundary line that, as a minimum, is defined, or in the process of being defined, by the parties, by implicit consent or explicit agreement. This implies that all stakes and issues leading to disputes and armed conflicts are related to once and somehow agreed-upon boundaries. This definition then excludes frontiers, territorial claims, or conflicts taking place in border areas. In the following, then, the term boundary conflict will be used as a general reference to both minor problems and disputes and major armed conflicts over the boundary. A list of boundary conflicts covering the 50 year period from 1947 to 1996 will be used as the empirical basis for the analysis.⁽²⁾

Some cases in this list are then studied in greater depth to provide further insights in the final analysis.

1.2 Boundary Conflict, de-Escalation and Preventive Diplomacy

Interstate boundary conflicts de-escalate in at least two ways: formally, through an agreement that regulates behavior or issues at stake, or informally through a gradual reduction of the importance of the matter in dispute, into a situation where parties any longer consider it politically relevant. In addition to these ways of de-escalation, boundary conflicts can become "historic residuals", for instance following the restructuring or disappearance of the state. Examples of this, some of which are discussed in the following chapters by Choi and Hopmann, are the formally divided Germany and Yemen, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia. Not seldom, however, such processes give rise to new boundary problems, as in the last three cases.

Preventive diplomacy is here employed for de-escalation processes. It is used for situations where escalation processes on any level are thwarted before developing into their potential levels of violence. It may neither be possible nor desirable to prevent all kinds of conflicts, but escalation toward organized violence between the parties should in principle be the target for preventive negotiations.

2. Boundary Conflicts are post-Cold War Conflicts

It is a common view that the post-Cold War period has involved a large number of minority problems, some of them escalating into ethnic conflict and war. In line with this view goes the argument that boundaries have become more fluid, more often challenged and generally more prominent bones of contention than was the case during the Cold war. If this is true, it has not so far been reflected at the level of major armed conflicts (defined as involving over 1000 battle-related deaths since the conflict began). In 1996 there were 36 such major armed conflicts active in 29 countries, but only 16 of them dealt with territory.⁽³⁾

Table 1 below shows territorial conflicts for 1996, a typical year for the 1990s. It indicates that there was only one inter-state conflict in that year, between India and Pakistan. So far, the international system has been able to keep boundary conflicts at a level much lower than many other types of conflicts. This is true even if there was, for instance, in 1999 a boundary conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and an increase in the level of conflict between India and Pakistan. If the end of the Cold war has spurred conflicts that challenge boundaries, it is still true that on the whole, they have not reached the level for inclusion in a list of ìmajorî armed conflicts. Thus, they constitute an interesting group of cases for the study of conflict prevention.

Table 1. Major armed conflicts over territory, active in 2000 (Wallensteen & Sollenberg l997, updated).

** "formed" is year of stated incompatibility, "joined" is year of began or recommenced use of armed force

If the level of casualties is lowered to a minimum of 25 casualties, we find for the post-Cold war period between 1989 and 1996 that three additional interstate conflicts in this period were related to their respective common boundary: Mauritania - Senegal (active in 1989 and 1990), Ecuador - Peru (active most recently in 1995) and Nigeria- Cameroon (1996). A lower level of casualties reveals potentially serious situations. In Latin America alone, at least eight problematic boundary situations can be identified as potential threats to regional stability, and in addition cases of litigation and future potential problems (such as the status of Guantanamo or the Panama Canal) are included. ⁽⁴⁾

On the other end of casualties, the Second Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait (1991) was not a conflict over the boundary line, but a state formation conflict. Iraq regarded Kuwait as its nineteenth province and Kuwait was to disappear as a sovereign state. After the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, and through the UN-led Iraq-Kuwait boundary-making process, the conflict did become a boundary conflict in its final stages .

3. The de-Escalation of Boundary Conflicts

3.1 A Pattern of Boundary Conflict de-Escalation

The division between formal and informal de-escalation processes will here be used as a basic categorization. We will analyze a fifty year period by first looking at boundary conflicts active at some point in time between 1947 and 1979, and, secondly, studying their fate up to 2000. Whether reached an agreement in this period or not, these thirty conflicts are followed up to present. The conflict is described with respect to four different categories as conflicts that:

(A) escalated into major wars and/or were active conflicts in 2000,

(B) were settled by a durable agreement or through international legal decision,

(C) faded away into non-existence or insignificance as a political issue, or

(D) were affected by a new state's formation, making the case not applicable.

In order to provide some information about the stakes of the parties in their respective conflicts, each conflict is described with respect to four issue categories:

1) trans-boundary minorities in the disputed area,

2) trans-boundary resources in the disputed area,

3) an unclear frontier/colonial situation, or

4) implementation problems of an earlier agreement between the parties.

Brought together, this makes a list of 30 boundary conflicts (Table 2), some of which have more than one agreement. In three cases there has been a restructured context, making the case not relevant for comparison. Six cases have continued as active conflicts, some of them reaching a level of major armed conflicts, such as China-India, Ecuador-Peru, India-Pakistan and Iran-Iraq. Also, the now settled Ethiopia-Somalia war over Ogaden belongs to the group of major armed conflicts.

Table 2. Boundary conflicts active 1947-1979 and status as of 2000, listed by category. (+ indicates major conflict issue; I/II indicates two agreements and the respective years).

The remaining 21 cases have all de-escalated, formally or informally. Thus 2/3 of all boundary conflicts active between 1947 and 1979 have been brought to a settled or non-active situation. This is in itself a major process of conflict de-escalation. In all formal cases (totalling 12) there has been a negotiatory component in the process. Also in the informal solutions we find negotiating initiatives. In four cases ñ no. 6 to 9 ñ there are explicit diplomatic efforts to settle the issue, and in three of them (no. 7, 8, and 9) an agreement was made to accept colonial boundaries. The formal and informal de-escalation categories are interesting to compare: do they show stakes managed differently? What role does preventive negotiation play in their de-escalation? Are the informal de-escalation processes examples of effective preventive negotiations or not? Before turning to these questions a few observations remain to made about the content in Table 2.

3.2 Stakes and De-escalation

In addition to the distribution between active and de-escalated conflicts, it is interesting to observe that the number of major issues in the conflicts that were maintained (A) or formally de-escalated (B) is significantly higher than for the informally de-escalated (C) group. While the C-group has on average 1.4 issues/conflict, the B-group has 2.3 and the A-group 2.7. The informally de-escalated conflicts thus have fewer issues to manage. This does not necessarily mean that they are easier to manage. It may well be the opposite: the pie is smaller, there is less to share. Also, few issues cannot in themselves be seen as a sign of less intensity: not the number but the character of stakes sets the intensity.

The relatively low number of issues in the non-formal de-escalation processes can be interpreted as being a group of processes where the conflict issues were relatively unimportant to the parties, thus they were left to their "own fate" among other issues competing for management.

Even if the issues were not relatively unimportant and the conflict instead had an important issue in its heart, a situation of few issues allows more easily than complex situations an input of external resources that can make the pie larger and thus easier to regulate.

Another observation to be made is, that among the informally de-escalated conflicts, three out of nine (the last three cases in that category) were settled through a re-affirmation of a pre-independence, colonial agreement. For these cases, all being African, it meant an application of the OAU principle of respect for territorial integrity and inherited boundaries.

4. Managing Stakes in Formal de-Escalation

The formally de-escalating cases described above involve regulation of major issues. In most cases there is one agreement, but in some cases there are two, or even three i.e. at least two escalation and de-escalation processes. These are included here since they also are examples of issue management. But how is this regulation made? Which trade-offs through substantial reshaping of how stakes are made in the boundary agreements? Three categories can be found:

* compensation,

* partition or sharing of resources, and

* adaptation (i.e. practically motivated changes of a boundary line, mostly on ethnic grounds).

The purpose of such mutual accommodation is of course to create durable boundary agreements. As Table 3 shows, such accommodation is connected to durable agreements, with only two exceptions out of l6 cases. This shows a clear relationship between substantial restructuration of stakes and agreement durability.

Table 3. Durable ("Yes") and not durable ("No") boundary agreements following conflicts active 1947 - 2000 Mutual accommodation is indicated by italics, failure of agreement in normal style.

The two cases that had a trade-off construction in the agreement but were not durable were Burma-China I and Ethiopia-Kenya I. Both cases include a change of status of one of the parties after the agreement, going from a colonial administration into independence. This is a most important factor in both cases behind the decision to conclude a second agreement.

If compensation, resource sharing or partition, and adaptation to local conditions are the mechanisms behind a durable agreement, how do changes as those come about? Two types of changes are theoretically possible:

a) changes of the structure of the conflict system (i.e. composition of actors, resource availability, number of stakes), or

b) changes of a party's positions, in an otherwise unchanged conflict system.

In the first type, the parties themselves are not always capable of influencing the changes. Third parties, in particular powerful third parties, may be able to influence these situations. The second type of change, however, is mainly the task of an individual party. Most important here is to note that both types can be the object of preventive diplomatic initiatives. Of course, changes of the types described can be, and usually are, combined. In some cases, however, one of the two types seems to be a sufficient explanation. In all of these cases, the need for good relations with a neigbor outweighed particualr claims of one of the parties.

The Algeria-Tunisia conflict is a case of changes in the conflict system: some years before the boundary agreement was signed in 1970, a number of agreements concerning cultural relations, postal services, customs, commerce, electric power and other areas were made already in 1963 between the two countries. In addition, oil was later discovered on both sides of the "boundary-in-being". Both parties, then, had an interest in a final, positive solution. Tunisian President Bourguiba termed the process of setting aside territorial claims for greater mutual benefits in other issues one of dépassement.⁽⁸⁾

In this case, the changing structural conditions in the years before the boundary issue was regulated clearly paved the way for a peaceful conclusion.

Ethiopia-Kenya 1970 is another example of the same type of changes. The negotiations of a boundary agreement started already before Kenyan independence, but even if a text was agreed upon earlier, they were not finalized until 1970.⁽⁹⁾

The main problem of the conflict was the Gadaduma wells which the British claimed from Ethiopia during their administration. For Kenya it was more important to obtain a positive security relationship with Ethiopia, against Somalia, than to change certain aspects of the boundary. The changing conflict system for Kenya, going from British rule to independence, which made security concerns prominent for the then newly independent state, caused a shift in priorities vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which had not undergone a similar change of international status.

Algeria - Morocco is a final case in point in the first category. Morocco gradually abandoned its claims after a brief confrontation with Algeria in 1963 ending with the boundary agreement in 1970. Although the boundary matter as such was complicated and required several strong OAU interventions, the economic prospects for the Tindouf region and its potential for Morocco's southern economy was an important factor in the final settlement process (Tlemcen meeting), along with Morocco's need to consolidate security relations with its neighbor in preparation for the decoloniztion of the Spanish Sahara.

If these cases are examples of conflict system changes, the Mali-Mauritania case is an example of changing positions. In this case the changes were made by an individual leader. In l960 the Mauritanian president Ould Daddah was in 1960 critical toward Mali, straining the boundary relations. He consciously developed a more conciliatory standpoint in the years to come, and the boundary was altered to approximate traditional grazing patterns. It can be discussed to what extent this change was based on a re-evaluation of the situation or upon the effects of the historically based Moroccan pressure on Mauritania, and the consequent need for Mauritania to develop good relations with at least one other neighbor, Mali.⁽¹⁰⁾

The basic conditions were the same for Mauritania during these years of position change. A constructive approach, through the change in position, was taken in this way, and from the treaty of Kayes in 1963 onwards no further serious boundary problems arose.

5. The Prevention of Boundary Conflict Escalation

From the observations on how stakes were managed in formal agreements, we now turn to the experiences of thwarting escalation before it reaches its potential levels of violence. The four cases selected for this analysis are found in Table 2: Kenya-Somalia, Ethiopia-Somalia (the Somali conflicts), Honduras-Nicaragua, and Ecuador-Peru. These four cases represent four different types of situations in Table 2. One case was finalized through international legal decision (Honduras- Nicaragua), one is a major conflict maintained over two agreements and now regulated in a recent one (Ecuador-Peru), one had ended through an agreement, however of limited scope, (Ethiopia-Somalia), and one has de-escalated without any formal arrangement (Kenya-Somalia). In each of the four cases, examples of the management of stakes, the attitudes of the parties toward each other, and the tactics employed for reaching a particular goal will be given. Even though stakes, attitudes and tactics are hardly separated in actual preventive processes, they will nonetheless be treated separately below.

5.1 Managing Stakes

The Somali Conflicts

The conflict between Somalia and two of its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, started with Somali independence in 1960. It can be traced to problems created by the lacking congruence between, on the one hand, the colonial and inherited new state boundaries, and, on the other hand, ethnically homogenous areas. The Somali idea of a Greater Somalia encompassing all Somali-speaking peoples was aimed at rectifying this situation created by the colonial powers on the Horn of Africa. The Somali position at independence - if realized - posed a threat to practically all African states, since they all contain regions which would be affected by claims similar to those of Somalia upon its neighbors.

The main issue for Somalia - to bring all Somalis under one nation-state - was not regulated either in the 1988 agreement with Ethiopia or in any treaty with Kenya. The stakes Somalia brought into these conflicts - the idea of Greater Somalia - were only managed, not resolved. They have been set aside for other priorities. The period before the (still valid) agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia from 1988 can be described as a hurting stalemate following the Ogaden war in 1978 (Zartman l989, chap. 3).

Besides the lack of regulation of the Greater Somalia goal, there have been escalation (1961, 1964) and de-escalation (1967) processes. In connection to these, a series of mediation efforts has been taken by the OAU as well as by individual heads of state, and others.⁽¹¹⁾

Observations

The Somali case shows that de-escalation through preventive diplomacy such as negotiation and mediation is possible also when a major issue is left unregulated. In fact, the "unregulation" was the key to progress in other areas. The conditions for this change of position may be unacceptable if they include war, but the Somali case goes beyond this. De-escalation in the Somali case is a parallel process of influences from an emerging OAU and its diplomatic efforts, and from individual instances of mediation. The Somali challenge to African unity and territorial integrity in a way helped the emerging organization for the newly independent African states to develop a position on territorial matters.⁽¹²⁾

A normative basis for inter-state relations in Africa was developed on a regional basis through these extra-ordinary measures, undertaken to avoid an escalation of Somali border relations. Besides the short term effect, such as pressures for and the maintenance of cease-fire, the long-term effect should not be underestimated.

Honduras-Nicaragua

This case had two crises situations, both resulted in a particular management of the stakes involved. The Bonilla-Gomez boundary treaty was signed between Honduras and Nicaragua, in l894. A mixed commission was set up to solve problems of the implementation of the agreement, but it was not able to settle some issues. These were referred to arbitration by the King of Spain. The award, handed over in 1906, was well received in Honduras but Nicaragua argued it was invalid. In substance the award to a large extent met Honduran claims. "Although the award did not grant Honduras all that it had desired, the award can hardly be called a compromise," writes Johnson (1964, p. 7). Efforts throughout the inter-war period were fruitless and in 1957 Honduras created a local district, i.e. in practice extended the governmentís penetration into an area which also included the area disputed by Nicaragua. This created an acute crisis. The OAS intervened and managed to get the parties accept to place the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which

in 1960 stated that the 1906 award was valid. In 1961, then, the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) of the OAS was forced to intervene in order to prevent a most likely repetition of the 1957 military confrontation.

Honduras and Nicaragua tried in direct talks in 1960 and 1961 to settle the matter but talks stalled in February 1961. While Nicaragua agreed to abide by the judgment of the ICJ, Honduras wanted a more rapid execution of the decision than did Nicaragua. At this point the two states could only agree that IAPC should take action in order to execute the ICJ decision. Following several drafts, a "basis of arrangement" was agreed upon, regulating the steps and stages of withdrawal and insertion of new authorities. Both countries were asked immediately to withdraw troops from areas that were supposed to be evacuated according to the arrangement. Also, inhabitants could chose between staying and changing nationality or moving into Nicaragua proper. Finally, the arrangement provided for some demarcation procedures.

As a third party in the execution of the ICJ judgment, the IAPC was able to smooth the movement of goods and people, including facilitation of cross-border farming. In all some 4000 persons were moved into Nicaragua. It seems that the IAPC Mixed Commission executing the ICJ judgment acted effectively and with a view to practical solutions. Its combination of social and boundary-making tasks was not a hinderance but rather the opposite, since these two processes are closely related to each other. Johnson (1964, p l63) concludes that "[w]ithout the available machinery of the Organization of American States in 1957 and in 1961 it is highly probable that the dispute would not have been solved or that increased violence would have occurred before a settlement was reached".

Observations

This is an ideal case of stake management in the sense that it involves an agreed procedure at a higher level than the parties, and that it is limited in its extent only to issues where the parties are not able to act themselves. It includes a combination of ingredients for successful prevention of escalation: the conflict was not over a core issue, it was dealt with over a long time (i.e. several governments in the respective countries were part of the procedures), and preventive diplomacy was an official process, involving a long-standing commitment.

The direct preventive initatives - referral to ICJ and OAS - did not imply a complete take over of the process, and the finalizing of the agreement was left to the parties. Once the parties finalized the settlement process, they had to give it over to a level where it could be managed peacefully; this gave them a stake in maintaining what they achieved in the conclusion of the process. This is not always the case.⁽¹³⁾

An important observation from this process is then, that the preventive measures taken served the parties' wish for settlement only on the level and to the extent that they were not able to handle it themselves. The responsibilities they were able to undertake remained in their hands.

Ecuador-Peru

Peru gained independence in 1821; the following year, Quito also gained independence from Spain but immediately joined the Gran Colombia Republic under Simon Bolivar. In the Treaty of Guayaquil of 1829, Peru and the Viceroyalty of New Granada--both independent--established their boundary through the work of a joint commission. The Treaty of Guayaquil was approved by the respective congresses and instruments of ratification were exchanged. In 1830 Ecuador seceded from Colombia (New Granada) and became independent. Peru did not accept that the new Ecuadorian state had inherited any rights under the Guayaquil Treaty of 1829, concluded with Gran Colombia.

Several confrontations of a political, military and diplomatic nature took place over the border issue in the following years. Negotiation efforts in the 1840s were fruitless, and in 1853 Ecuador passed a law on free navigation on disputed rivers. Peru broke relations with Ecuador in 1857.

Following "perhaps half a dozen attempts" (Area Handbook of Ecuador, 1966, p. 289) to settle the issue, both countries agreed in 1887, in the Espinosa-Bonifaz Treaty, to ask the King of Spain to arbitrate a division of the disputed Oriente region as a whole.⁽¹⁴⁾

However, both parties felt in advance that the award might turn out unfavorably, but for different reasons.⁽¹⁵⁾

After a new series of diplomatic exchanges, also involving Colombia, the Spanish King was again, in 1904, approached for arbitration. The King accepted and the Spanish Council of State decided in 1909 to recommend a border line to be adopted by the King in his award. However, the proposed line became publicly known before awarded and the King decided in November 1910 not to make any award in view of the tension between the two parties. "War between the two states seemed imminent."⁽¹⁶⁾

In this tense situation, the United States, Argentina and Brazil offered their mediation services. However, Ecuador and Peru were not able to settle their differences through the services of the mediating powers. Following the establishment of the 1936 status quo line, both countries accused each other of frequent border incursions. No sign of a settlement process was and the United States became increasingly involved in World War II. In May 1941, the USA, Argentina and Brazil offered their friendly services to mediate in the conflict, which Ecuador accepted but Peru did not; Chile was also made mediator in the l942 Rio de Janeiro conference.

In July 1941, fighting broke out in two border areas: the Zarumilla and in the Oriente. Some 1500 men were fighting on each side in the Zarumilla sector, while figures for troops in the Oriente are around 1000 Ecuadorians and 3000 Peruvians (Wood, 1978, p. 103); about 500 were killed or wounded, at least two-thirds of whom were Peruvians (Area Handbook 1966, pp. 296f). Following a truce in October (the Talara Truce), where a demilitarized zone controlled by neutral observers was established, the mediators tried to reach consensus on an agreement. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, the United States allowed Brazil to take the initiative on behalf of the mediating group. Brazilan Foreign Minister Aranha proposed a line, without total consensus in the mediating group, in order to reach an agreement during the Third Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. The line is with two exceptions that agreed in the 1942 Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries, signed by the Ecuador, Peru and the four mediating powers: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States.

The 1942 Protocol was formally ratified by the Congresses of Ecuador and Peru. However, Ecuador was at an early stage discontented with the Protocol and did not accept the line, on various grounds (historic, moral and legal); in 1960 it declared the Protocol null and void. Following Peruvian appeals, the guarantors declared the Protocol valid. The guarantors used legal and non-legal arguments for their position. One argument was that only 78 km of the total boundary was uncompleted in 1960; another that "[i]t is a basic principle of international law that the unilateral will of one of the Parties is not sufficient to invalidate a boundary treaty nor to liberate it from the obligations imposed therein" (Whiteman l964, pp 676-80, cited in Kaikobad l988, p 91). However Ecuador did not accept the guarantors' decision, and in 1965 again claimed the invalidity of the Protocol since it, among other reasons, "was illegally secured by the employment of armed force, and by the occupation and retention of large portions of its territory" (Wood l978, p 219).

Military incidents in the border area took place in 1953, 1977-78, 1981 and 1995, with different levels of casualties. In September 1977 US President Jimmy Carter raised the issue with the two parties on the occasion of signing the Panama Canal treaties but talks were again suspended in 1978. Hostilities also occurred in 1981, and the OAS became involved in preventing an escalation of the conflict. A cease-fire was agreed after five days of fighting. A minor diplomatic controversy arose in 1991, when the issue was raised i.a. in the United Nations, following the first visit of a Peruvian President to Ecuador. In January 1995 severe confrontations took place in the Upper Cenepa region of the Oriente, where aerial surveys had discovered previously unknown topological features. The Declaration of Itamaraty from 1995 provided the political basis of continued talks between the two countries. In 1998, finally, the parties were able to conclude a comprehensive boundary agreement, defining the boundary in the new disputed areas, creating a nature park along the border, allowing non-sovereign access for Ecuador to the upper tributaries of the Amazon, and providing for joint development of the isolated border area.

Observations

Already from the early phases of this conflict, the parties nurtured two different perspectives in understanding its eventual solution. Ecuador stressed the historic documents and their congruence with basic national aspirations of the country, i.e. to be an Amazonian nation, combining effective contact with the Pacific as well as with the Amazon river. For Peru, on the other hand, the Amazonian dimension has been secondary to state building, i.e. to effective presence in frontier regions and the use of diplomatic and military means to secure its interests. The differences between the two states in population, size and economic capacity added to these political differences. Ecuador and Peru have had different stakes in the border regions - Ecuadors have been idealistic, stressing the colonial heritage, historic rights, legal rights, and trusted the inter-American system as a partner in dealing with an often superior neighbor. Peru has nurtured materialistic stakes, stressing the evidence of physical presence, the unclear legal situation and the need to increase its penetration into Upper Amazonas.

After the 1942 Rio Protocol, the stakes did not change, but their material basis did. Ecuador accepted the Protocol as a foundation for a solution. This since 1995 was agreed to by Peru as well, which for a long time had claimed that no substantial matters remained after 1942 and an arbitration case a few years later. The peace process after the 1995 incidents, based on the Itamaraty Declaration, initiated management of the stakes in a way that was closer to conclusion than in previous attempts. The key to the pprevention of future conflict was the reformulation of stakes as the jointly profitable economic development of the region, impossible without an greement, rather than zero-sum sovereignty.

5.2 Attitudes and Tactics

The Somali Conflicts

Somalia changed the approach to the boundary problems it had with Kenya and Ethiopia in a few months time during 1967. Escalations in the conflict had occurred several times during the first half of the 1960s. In September 1967, however, the first steps were taken towards a radically new relationship between the three countries, beginning at a meeting in Kinshasa, after mediation by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

When major substantial changes take place in the relations between parties, it is often described as a change in attitudes. Touval (1972, p 233) for instance, writes about the Somali cases, after a series of agreements in 1968 and 1969: "These agreements, and the rapid change from hostility to conciliation, became possible because of a modification in the attitudes and positions of the disputants." The problem is, what is the chicken and what is the egg? Crucial for this analysis is to what extent both positions and attitudes are the primary movers of changes? Why have positions and attitudes changed?

Tracing the process "backward" we find that the tactics employed by the Somali government, once it had decided upon its new approach to the boundary problems, were different from previous attempts. Before the Kinshasa meeting, Somalia ceased hostile propaganda and guerilla activities. Also, Somalia approached both Ethiopia and Kenya at the same time (not one by one as in previous attempts), thus making it difficult for one of them to hinder the other. In fact, a third party, France, also became involved at some point, when the lessening of tensions was agreed between France and Somalia over the Afar and Issa territories.

Given the tactics employed are successful, what attitudes do they require? In the Somali case, the key was the view that the core value of Greater Somalia does not need to be realized immediately, but that Somalia could gain more from other values' being strengthened, while waiting for an opportunity to pursue the most important value. Such a position did not imply a compromise or abandonment of the core value as a main stake. Again, as in other preventive cases, Somalia considered it increasingly necessary in the 1960s to have good neighborly relations with the surrounding countries.

This change of attitudes, in its turn, required a core issue that was of the character that it could be managed. Unification. a principle affecting neighboring states, has been a demand in many constitutions (Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Ireland). This issue is such that it can be managed through psotponement, a change of time perspective and not only space conditions. It should also be noted that the stable and peaceful relations developed between Somalia and its surrounding states lasted only until 1969, when a new president, Siad Barre, seized power and the conflicts escalated again. The Ogaden war in 1978 was a major confrontation in that process, whose inconclusive results led to another conflict management agreement in l986-88 and then to the ultimate change--the collapse of the Somali state (Zartman l989, chap 3; Adam l995).

Honduras-Nicaragua

This long-standing Central American conflict between diametrically different views among the parties over where to locate the boundary line has been managed in spite of consistent and temporarily heatened feelings among the parties. The parties' weak interest in settling the conflict at all during the first part of this century caused a slow and, in retrospect, inefficient management of the issue by both parties at critical moments. In its early stages, the problem was a remote and insignificant incompatibility over a territory whose characteristics were rarely known by the respective governments. Nicaraguan congratulations to Honduras after having lost a sizeable piece of territory to Honduras in the 1906 Award by the Spanish King (Johnson, p. 9) is indicative: there was a need to show respect for "civilized means of settlement of disputes" (Johnson, p. 15); the territory in question was not the main concern. However, Nicaragua raised concerns already in 1907 and later in 1912 about matters that remained part of the dispute throughout, including consideration by the ICJ, and that supported the animosities surrounding the matter. Also, the value of the disputed territory gradually became important for the respective governments, in particular in connection with oil drillings in the area in the 1950s.

The many preventive measures by the US, the IAPC, and Venezuela and Costa Rica, were all taken under a constant posture from both parties that positions could not be changed.⁽¹⁷⁾

This partly explains the dragging process. A change of attitudes to any degree relevant for the conflict process has not been possible to identify in the literature over this conflict. Its most important lesson then, in retrospect, is that in spite of the strong negative feelings, the process could be brought forward to a settlement that was finally accepted. All ingredients for military confrontations were at hand: only the preventive measures undertaken--at least 10 separate initiatives between 1913 and 1961--can explain the low level of violence during the conflict period.

Ecuador-Peru

The parties to this complex conflict, with all its escalation and de-escalation processes, have changed their outlook in recent years when it comes to the emotional aspects of the conflict - in stark contrast to its long history (Wood l978). This is not to say that the old patterns are not expressed in current popular and political views. However, the 1995 crisis and its diplomatic continuation was and is dealt with by both parties in a way that confirms a gradual evolutionon both sides since 1981, toward a recognition of the existence of a problem (Peru) and the necessity to find a political solution based on the conditions created by the Rio Protocol (Ecuador). This attitudinal change is due to generational changes among the military and diplomatic elites, as well as the gradual idiosyncratic appearance of the whole matter, in a region of modernization, integration, and globalization processes.

6. Summary

From this brief analysis of on-going as well as regulated boundary conflicts, a set of observations about preventive diplomatic efforts in such situations can be made. It was shown that a large majority (2/3) of boundary conflicts de-escalated, through negotiation as well as in informal ways, during the twenty year period. In this development it is interestingly enough the more complex conflicts, in terms of issues at stake, that are formally regulated, not the simple (one issue) cases. The risk of recurrent conflict is present in all cases of regulation. In the complex cases, recurrent conflict is prevented in one of three ways of managing the stakes: 1) compensation for lost resources, 2) partition or sharing of resources, or 3) changes of a boundary line to meet certain demands (adaptation). Such measures were shown to be effective preventive measures in boundary conflict processes.

Interestingly enough, conflicts with few issues are the ones that fade away unregulated. The difference is significant as compared to the more complex ones. The reason found most plausible here was that in these cases the issues at stake were surpassed by other matters which made them fade away into a politically insignificant status--Bourguiba's notion of dépassement. This is, in addition, more likely to happen in cases with few issues as long as they are not major, strategic concerns for one of the parties. Such issues are "indivisibles" less susceptible to bargaining than material stakes and so can only be worn out rather tha traded off.⁽¹⁸⁾

In the final case analysis, examples were given from cases where a series of preventive diplomatic efforts kept serious inter-state boundary conflicts from escalation (Honduras-Nicaragua, the Somali cases), and where consistently intransigent attitudes were overcome by a systematic application of internationally based third party preventive initiatives. Finally, in line with the observation from the general overview of issues and non-formal de-escalation, the case studies also indicate that differences in the nature of stakes can be an asset, not necessarily an obstacle, for finding a durable basis for peaceful boundary relations.

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1. Kautilya, Arthasastra, trans. R Shamasastry (Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House, l960). 289.

2. The study is empirically largely based on Nordquist, 1992, which is a study of conditions for durable boundary agreements.

3. Territory" and "government" are the two types of conflict recorded. The first types indicate a conflict over the constitutional structure of a state, for instance over a demand for autonomy or secession (called ìstate formation warî), the second indicating a conflict over central government power (i.e. traditional civil war).

4. The cases mentioned by Aravena (1997) are nine: Guatemala-Belize, Nicaragua-Colombia (San Andres and Providencia Islands), Colombia-Venezuela, Venezuela-Guyana (Essequibo region), Ecuador-Peru, Argentina-Chile Argentina-Great Britain, and Bolivia-Chile. In 1998, however, the Ecuador-Peru boundary conflict was settled. In addition to the cases the Guyana-Surinam boundary should also be mentioned.

5. Agreements in Nov. 1988 and again 1997. Certain problems remain (Ussuri River) which qualifies for this category (A).

6. One major issue remains from the 1984 agreement (Southern Ice Field/Patagonian Glaciers).

7. It has not been shown what was the substantial boundary problem. Touval (1972) suggests the boundary was a mirror of internal politics of antagonism between the two countries.

8. I William Zartman, International Relations in the New Afrtica (Lanham: University Press of America, l987), p ll4.

9. Touval l972, p. 249.

10. Saadia Touval, Boundary Politics in Independent Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l972).

11. Touval l972; S O Abgi, The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy (Lagos: Impact Publishers, l986 Aforka Nweke, the Harmonization of African Foreign Policies (Boston: Boston University African Studies Center, l980)

12. This is not to say that there was always unanimity among African leaders, but at critical moments Somalia sometimes was left isolated, such as in the OAU Council of Ministersí meeting in Lagos, Feb. 24, 1964 over a demand for referendum in areas with transboundary minority situations.

13. A recent and in some respects extreme case in point is the UN Boundary Commission re-establishing the Iraq-Kuwait boundary.

14. If the King of Spain refused, the President of France, the King of Belgium and the Council of the Swiss Federation should be asked ñ in the order mentioned ñ to arbitrate.

15. Ecuador suspected the award to be affected by "extra-legal considerations", i.e. influence from Peruvian elite groups with stronger connections and family relationships in Madrid than had Ecuador's elite groups. Peru on its side, weakened by defeat in the War of the Pacific, was sure of its legal case and suspected a military attack from Ecuador should the award turn out unfavorably for Ecuador. Thus, better then an award is a negotiated settlement, which may then turn out more favorably.

16. George Maier, "The Boundary Dispute between Ecuador and Peru," American Journal of International Law, LXVI (1969) 1:42)

17. Even if Nicaragua was most challenged by the 1906 Award, Honduras was also difficult to deal with. Costa Rica became irritated, over what it described as Honduran intransigence in the work of a Mediation Commission active in 1937, to the degree that the Commissionís failure ought to be blamed on Honduras, according to Costa Rica. (Johnson, p. 17).

18. See Cecilia Albin, "Negotiating Indivisible Goods," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations XIII l:45-76 (l99l). On the debate over the solubility of disputes over tangible stakes, see John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge University Press, l993), 45-85 et passim; William Thompson, "Principled Rivalries," Journal of Conflict Resolution XXXIX 2:l95-223; and Paul Huth, "Enduring Rivalries and Territorial Disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science V l:7-41 (l996)