In this concise essay, Alexander George and Jane Holl argue that leaders need the kind of warning that will induce them to act preventively, not simply warning that a bad situation is getting worse. Leaders tend to put off hard decisions as long as they can, and this has often resulted in delay or paralysis in dealing with developing crises. To prevent violent conflicts, leaders must overcome this initial policy paralysis.
The events that could trigger widespread violence are usually different from the events that trigger a preventive response from outside parties. It would not, for example, have been possible to give an unambiguous, precise warning that a plane crash in Central Africa would precipitate the slaughter of nearly one million people. But many earlier indications of the possibility of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 were ignored, and no preventive plan of action was in place. As George and Holl point out, outside parties must become more receptive to warning.
Early warning will not ensure successful preventive action unless there is a fundamental change of attitude by governments and international organizations. Third parties should not simply wait for unambiguous disasters and mass slaughter before they take preventive action. Rather, a systematic and practical early warning system should be combined with consistently updated contingency plans for preventive action that provide leaders with a repertoire of responses. This would be a radical departure from the present system, where when a trigger event sets off an explosion of violence, it is usually too difficult, too costly, and too late for a rapid and effective response. This early warning system would be a crucial component of the international preventive framework envisioned by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
The Commission has always defined broadly the groups that would participate in such a system. States, nongovernmental organizations, business enterprises, religious leaders, scientific groups, the media, and international organizations all have a role to play in providing early warning and in responding to warning. Logically, early warning should be given first to those who can take action. This generally means governments and groups likely to be immediately involved in the crisis, governments and leaders nearest to the scene of conflict, the United Nations (particularly the member states of the UN Security Council), and regional organizations. Religious hierarchies may also be warned, particularly of situations in which local religious leaders and institutions could play positive roles. In addition, those who can induce governments, organizations, and agencies to act (the media, business communities, and concerned publics) should be kept informed of badly deteriorating situations. Public expectations that governments will act responsibly to ward off disasters are a significant factor in motivating preventive actions.
This is one of several studies of the warning-response problem that the Commission is sponsoring. The role of leaders in responding to warning will be illuminated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, George Bush, Jimmy Carter, and Mikhail Gorbachev in a collection of essays to be published in the fall. Professor Bruce Jentleson, director of the University of California, Davis, Washington Center, is editing a set of 11 case studies of preventive diplomacy in the post-Cold War world that will appear in the Commission book series published by Rowman & Littlefield. Recognizing the important and sometimes ambiguous role of the media in providing warning and motivating response, the Commission has asked three distinguished journalists, Tom Gjelten, Nik Gowing, and Robert Manoff, to present their views in an essay collection. The Commission is also sponsoring several studies of instruments -- sanctions, incentives, mediation, and the military, for example -- to enlarge and sharpen leaders' repertoire of responses.
The Commission is grateful to Alex George and Jane Holl for advancing the thinking on this crucial aspect of conflict prevention.
David A. Hamburg
Cyrus R. Vance
Cochairs