Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, it seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

Commission publications fall into three categories: Reports to the Commission, Discussion Papers, and Reports of the Commission. Reports to the Commission are published as a service to scholars, practitioners, and the interested public. While Reports to the Commission have undergone peer review and have been approved for publication, the views they express are those of the author or authors, and Commission publication does not imply that those views are shared by the Commission as a whole or by individual Commissioners.

Additional copies of this report may be obtained free of charge from the Commission's headquarters:
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Washington, D.C. 20037-1153
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E-mail: pdc@carnegie.org

Foreword

What are sanctions good for? Can they stop wars, force countries to respect human rights, or stifle state-supported terrorism? Can they prevent deadly conflict? The recent record of sanctions is a mix of successes and failures. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a change in the role of sanctions in international relations in three distinct ways: First, sanctions have been used more frequently; second, they are being imposed for a broader range of reasons than ever before; and third, the UN has become the principal laboratory for testing their strength and scope.

Prompted by the increased importance of multilateral sanctions, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict decided that an assessment of their current salience and ways of enhancing their effectiveness would be helpful to practitioners and scholars of international relations. We are grateful to Commissioner Donald McHenry for pointing out the need for such an assessment, for focusing attention on strengthening the UN's sanctions infrastructure, and for chairing the Commission's working group on sanctions. We are also grateful to John Stremlau for his dedicated pursuit of these complex issues.

Usually the last resort before violence, sanctions are an essential tool of preventive action. The Commission discerns two categories of preventive action: alleviating risk factors when the danger of violence is imminent; and resolving root causes of violence. The first category includes such measures as identifying and strengthening moderate leaders, initiating formal negotiations, and imposing sanctions. The second category includes eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy and economic development, and working to improve health and education.

The Commission believes that sanctions can prevent violence in four ways. First, they signal international disapproval of a government's behavior toward other countries or its own citizens. Second, they are a necessary early reaction. If the target ignores sanctions, then the international community is justified in moving to harsher measures. Policymakers may not be able to build sufficient political support for the use of force if they have not signaled disapproval first with softer measures such as sanctions. Third, sanctions limit a state's freedom of action and motivate the state to correct bad behavior. And fourth, sanctions take their toll: States burdened by economic sanctions suffer in the competitive global economy.

Sanctions have two important drawbacks: They often harm countries that trade with the target country, and they can hurt children, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups in the target country. These unintended effects arouse opposition to sanctions from third countries and calls for softening sanctions when civilians suffer. Sanctions focused exclusively on the offending leaders can avoid these difficulties. The report describes the use of one such measure, financial sanctions, such as freezing the assets of leaders. Financial sanctions are currently available only to the U.S. and other countries with the technology to track and identify international transactions. With new international understandings regarding their use, financial sanctions can become a potent, precise tool of multilateral diplomacy.

This study is one of several Commission-sponsored projects related to sanctions. David Cortright of the Fourth Freedom Forum is editing a set of case studies of the role of inducements -- often used with sanctions in a carrot-and-stick approach -- in preventing deadly conflict. Elizabeth Rogers of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government has prepared a study of the use of economic sanctions specifically to prevent violence rather than reverse aggression or fundamentally resolve conflicts. An upcoming study of the business community and conflict prevention will also include a discussion of sanctions. The Commission will present its comprehensive view of the role of sanctions in its final report to be issued in fall 1997.

As the world becomes more economically interdependent, sanctions can become a sharper tool of preventive action. No longer an instrument of superpower competition, sanctions can be used by the community of nations to protest abuses and enforce norms of behavior between states and between governments and citizens. As this report points out, much hard work needs to be done to improve the effectiveness of UN-mandated sanctions. The difficulty of the task and the often frustrating work of forging a consensus among nations should not deter us from improving this alternative to violence. A solid institutional structure for sanctions will be a tremendous asset in the daily work of maintaining peace in the world.

David A. Hamburg
Cyrus R. Vance
Cochairs

Acknowledgments

This report builds on the deliberations of the economic sanctions working group of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Chaired by Ambassador Donald McHenry, the working group addressed the increasing importance of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War world and the role of the UN in mandating and monitoring multilateral sanctions. The report reflects the working group discussions, interviews with other experts in the field, and a review of the literature. The report does not necessarily represent the positions of the members of the Commission or the many individuals who contributed to its findings.

The Commission is grateful to the individuals who served on the working group: Robert Callard, U.S. State Department; Paul Conlon, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute; Graciana del Castillo, United Nations; David Cortright, Fourth Freedom Forum; David Cox, Canadian Center for Global Security; Robert Deutsch, U.S. State Department; Margaret Doxey, Trent University; Charles Dunbavand, SAMCOM Liaison Officer to the UN; Ivan Eland, Congressional Budget Office; Kimberly Elliott, Institute for International Economics; Gary Hufbauer, Institute for International Economics; G. Philip Hughes, National Council of World Affairs Organizations; Bruce Jentleson, University of California-Davis, Washington Center; Colin Keating, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the UN; George Lopez, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Ed Luck, United Nations Association of the USA; Lisa Martin, Harvard University; R. Richard Newcomb, U.S. Treasury Department; James Ngobi, United Nations; Alexander Borg Olivier, United Nations; Gerard Powers, U.S. Catholic Conference; William Alan Reinsch, Department of Commerce; Enid Schoettle, National Intelligence Council; Bob Shuey, Library of Congress; Joseph Stephanides, United Nations; David Terry, Central Intelligence Agency; Claudia von Braunmühl, Free University of Berlin. Andrew Yarrow researched and wrote background papers for the working group and provided essential technical assistance.

Chris Cooter, Margaret Doxey, William Durch, Kimberly Elliott, Jane Holl, April Kanne, Michael Kergin, George Lopez, and Elizabeth Rogers reviewed the manuscript at various stages and provided many helpful comments and suggestions.

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