Sharpening International Sanctions

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War and successful multilateral cooperation during the Gulf War led to a surge of United Nations-mandated sanctions. The Security Council imposed sanctions only twice between 1945 and 1990 but eight times between 1990 and 1994. In the two cases before 1990, Rhodesia and South Africa, the UN imposed sanctions to protest the denial of human rights and the domestic abuse of power within states rather than to counter traditional threats or acts of interstate aggression, as envisioned by the founders of the UN. Since the imposition of sanctions against Iraq in 1990, the Security Council has expanded the range of problems for which Chapter VII mandatory sanctions are justified: the use of force in the former Yugoslavia, Libya's support for terrorism, civil strife in Somalia and Liberia, genocide in Rwanda, the abrogation of democracy in Haiti, and renewed insurrection in Angola.

Sanctions generally serve three diplomatic functions. They send a signal of international concern to an offending state, seek to modify the unacceptable behavior of a state toward other states or against its own citizens, and warn of stronger actions to follow -- including the use of force. The power to impose sanctions remains the exclusive domain of national governments. The UN or other multilateral bodies can only authorize, not enforce, such measures. Sanctions only reflect international norms, they do not create them. They can, however, significantly affect the credibility of international norms. Indeed, the more sanctions become a regular and effective instrument, the greater should be their deterrent value as a tool of conflict prevention in dealing with potential aggressors or oppressors.

This report focuses on the feasibility and logic of stronger commitments by governments to use multilateral sanctions. It begins with a brief survey of international trends that will affect sanctions regimes in at least three ways:

• Greater international cooperation will be required if sanctions are to be effective in an increasingly open and integrated global economy.
• The unprecedented and continuing diffusion of power within and among states means that the diplomatic consensus required to ensure the effectiveness and legitimacy of sanctions will be increasingly difficult to forge and sustain.
• Proponents of sanctions will have to take much greater care in designing and applying graduated sanctions if they are to gain maximum international support in minimum time, e.g., financial sanctions aimed at isolating and punishing leaders deemed most responsible for the offending behavior.

The report does not attempt a comprehensive evaluation of prior sanctions regimes. Rather, it summarizes and compares sanctions mandated by the UN since 1990 and draws ten lessons:

• Most countries do not have the necessary legal and operational structures in place to impose sanctions, nor does the international community have an adequate multilateral coordinating mechanism at the UN or elsewhere to organize and implement sanctions quickly and effectively.
• Sanctions mandated since 1990 typically have lasted longer and been less successful, more costly, and more complex than their proponents had hoped, but they are widely perceived to have played an important role in at least one major case, influencing Serbia's decision to support the Dayton Peace Accord for the former Yugoslavia.
• By creatively interpreting "threats to international peace and security," UN sanctions have been aimed increasingly at preventing or resolving internal conflicts, thereby giving practical expression to a rapidly growing body of international law that is moving from state-to-state security to protecting the rights of people within states. In such cases sanctions also appear to have given encouragement to those opposing the abuse of power within a state, and who have or could assume responsibility for most of the remedial work.
• The imposition of sanctions also has helped to counter the problem and perception of impunity, especially individual impunity. Sanctions targeted to the privileged leaders who benefit the most from oppression or aggression are no longer able to hide behind the cloak of sovereign immunity and become candidates for eventual prosecution. In the event that a war crimes tribunal or a permanent criminal court is established, prosecution becomes the logical extension of such targeted sanctions.
• There is a growing conservative opposition to UN Security Council-mandated sanctions among the UN's majority of small states that fear an erosion of sovereign protection, and from China and other authoritarian governments hostile to foreign criticism of their domestic human rights policies. Recent decisions by central African states to impose sanctions against neighboring Burundi in an effort to restore civilian rule following the military coup on 9 July 1996, and the strict new sanctions that West African states imposed against Liberia in August 1996 in an effort to resolve that civil conflict may suggest that sanctions conceived and imposed by states within a troubled region may enjoy greater authority and legitimacy than those mandated by the UN Security Council.
• Damages that sanctions have wrought on states other than the target, and on innocent civilians within target countries, have aroused widespread humanitarian concern and have become rallying points for UN members who wish to limit the intrusiveness and scope of sanctions and for those who want to limit the powers of the Security Council.
• Rising demands for the establishment of special funds and other mechanisms to compensate states and peoples unintentionally hurt by sanctions have been generally rebuffed by the wealthy nations, which has further undermined the prospects for consensus regarding when, where, and how to impose sanctions.
• Setbacks in peace operations due in part to ill-considered and underfunded mandates have also strengthened the hands of those in the UN who are critical of any new "half-measures," including sanctions, that might further damage the UN's credibility.
• Sanctions operations need more and better-trained staff members. The UN's current financial crisis precludes these badly needed improvements.
• The U.S., whose leadership has provided the essential vision, strategy, and military backing for UN sanctions, has become more reserved in the mid-1990s and is hugely delinquent in paying its financial obligations to international institutions. None of the other major powers appears ready to provide the vision and to lead consensus-building efforts within the Council, which further weakens the prospects for collective action.

Drawing on this background assessment, the report considers efforts within the UN to improve capabilities to help governments carry out sanctions and deal with the politically contentious issue of assisting third countries and innocent civilians who suffer the effects of sanctions aimed at others. Findings are mixed regarding the current capacity and prospects for strengthening national and international sanctions structures:

• In the cases of Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, governments demonstrated new capabilities to undertake comprehensive UN-mandated sanctions. Difficult terrain and a diverse array of players with conflicting interests in the Balkans conflict necessitated a complex and expensive network of Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) that set new standards for professional monitoring and coordination through UN headquarters in New York. Yet in both cases the processes of granting UN humanitarian waivers became congested and corrupt, and there were widespread weaknesses in the ability or will of national governments to enforce these measures. Overall, however, no other sanctions regimes have enjoyed the breadth and intensity of support from the major powers and none of the emerging problems, such as Nigeria, is likely to generate similar commitments.
• UN-mandated sanctions since 1990 have all been weakened to varying degrees by slow or inadequate legal monitoring and enforcement capabilities of governments close to the problem whose support is essential for success. Whether or not these governments would have been willing to use such capabilities had they been available is beside the point. The international interest in the use of sanctions and the widespread deficiencies in the capacity to impose sanctions suggest that there be a concerted effort to develop "model" national sanctions legislation, procedures, and structures. These could then be adapted to suit particular problems and circumstances. But in the event that the Security Council mandates an arms embargo, a freezing of assets, or trade sanctions, all member governments would at least have a clear outline of steps to follow and could more quickly weigh the costs and benefits of compliance.
• The report's assessment of UN sanctions structures and procedures also revealed many internal shortcomings in responding to Security Council mandates. While some governments do not want any strengthening of the UN's capacity, particularly if this requires additional resources, the UN needs to be better equipped to fulfill its role in carrying out Security Council mandates and to respond to requests from other members who seek assistance in carrying out and adjusting to the effects of sanctions. In January 1995 the secretary-general proposed a five-point plan for improving the UN's capacity to assess the feasibility of likely sanctions, monitor their implementation, measure impact, ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance, and explore ways of helping nontarget member states hurt by sanctions. There is little political support among key members or progress in meeting these concerns. These issues are of sufficient material and political concern to member governments that they should be addressed as part of the broader UN reform efforts now under way.
• There appears to be a growing consensus within the UN that sanctions should be more narrowly focused at specific leaders responsible for the situation that has caused the Security Council to take action. The freezing of assets and other financial sanctions fit this category. Recent advances in intelligence gathering and communication have greatly increased the feasibility of such measures, at least for the United States and a few other technologically advanced countries. But there is no international consensus as to when and how to use financial sanctions as part of broader strategies to promote collective security. Any serious effort to strengthen national and UN sanctions structures and procedures should include developing a broader international awareness and agreement regarding the use of financial sanctions.
• Alleviating the damage that sanctions can cause in third countries and among innocent civilians in the target country has become more than a financial issue for many UN members. As resentment grows over the privileges enjoyed by the Security Council's five permanent members, who can mandate sanctions against others but veto any directed at them, demands for compensation for nontarget countries hurt by sanctions has become another way to challenge the Council's lack of accountability. It has also become a point of contention between rich and poor countries at a time of declining development assistance and growing international inequities. In December 1994 the General Assembly requested the secretary-general to report on what could be done under Article 50 to alleviate the economic problems confronting states as a result of Chapter VII sanctions. But after much study and debate, General Assembly Resolution 50/51 on this subject, approved in January 1996, reveals almost no progress. Until this matter is resolved, either by more effective targeting of sanctions or by providing compensation to the injured, the authority and legitimacy of future sanctions regimes will be degraded.

A UN Collective Measures Committee should be formed to build support for upgrading sanctions structures and procedures. Such a committee was mandated by the General Assembly in 1950 and during its two-year life offered many constructive recommendations that are still pertinent. A reconstituted Collective Measures Committee might initially address a five-point agenda: implementing the secretary-general's recent proposal for a new sanctions mechanism within the UN Secretariat; building national capacities to impose, monitor, and enforce sanctions; cooperating with regional organizations, the international business community, and nongovernmental organizations; combining sanctions with other preventive measures, including inducements and the threat of military action; and studying the value and limitations of financial sanctions. The report also suggests terms of reference and a structure for the committee and describes how it would operate. While this proposal will likely be resisted by governments opposed to strengthening or expanding the UN's capabilities, the committee could serve as an important forum for increasing the legitimacy of sanctions and for informing member governments of practical ways to improve the effectiveness of sanctions.