"The work, my friends, is peace: More than an end to this war, an end to the beginnings of all wars. Yes, an end forever to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of the differences between governments by the mass killing of peoples." So wrote Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 11, 1945, the day before he died. 1 In Roosevelt's vision the United Nations would prevent the beginnings of wars. For nearly 50 years the UN contributed to moderating the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, but nuclear deterrence, not the UN, became the fulcrum of international order. Now that the Cold War is over, governments face historic decisions about whether, when, and how to use the UN as an instrument for preventing deadly conflict.
As originally conceived, the UN's primary mission was to prevent wars of aggression between states, not the wars within states that are so prevalent today. Governments interested in resolving civil conflicts and preventing their escalation or proliferation have attempted to use the UN in ways that have been fraught with difficulties. International economic sanctions have featured prominently in these collective efforts. As an alternative to the use of military force, Western powers have repeatedly sought to use economic sanctions in response to important but nonvital threats to their national interests and values. Although the record raises many troubling questions about the efficacy of sanctions, the positive role that they appear to have played in 1995 in pressuring the Serbian government to support the Dayton Peace Accords and ending the war in Bosnia has fueled hopes that sanctions can be used to meet similar challenges in the future. This report seeks to give context and content to these hopes.
UN principles prohibiting the threat or use of force except in self-defense are at the heart of the Charter's provisions for collective security. Unlike the League of Nations Covenant, which also espoused these principles, the UN Charter became the first treaty to authorize and establish procedures for the imposition of economic or military sanctions. 2 When the Security Council determines, under Chapter VII, Article 39, of the UN Charter, the "existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," mandatory actions can be authorized under Articles 41 and 42 that apply to all members of the UN. 3 Article 41 authorizes "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Should these measures prove to be inadequate, Article 42 allows "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Use of these powers has been rare. As there is no higher authority than the national governments who signed the Charter, the powers that governments have granted the UN are not instruments of law enforcement but only provisions for their collective security. Major military action by the UN has occurred only twice since its creation: in Korea and Iraq. Both were carried out primarily by one nation, the United States, with UN authorization.
UN economic sanctions were used only twice during the Cold War: against Rhodesia (1966-1979) following the white minority's unilateral declaration of independence, and against South Africa (1979-1994) when Britain and the U.S. finally yielded to growing international pressures and joined a Security Council majority in imposing a comprehensive arms embargo. In the case of South Africa, more important sanctions were applied when the U.S. Congress overrode a presidential veto and in 1986 passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. This action, together with similar ones by South Africa's major economic partners in Europe, is widely credited with persuading the white minority to relinquish power peacefully. Then, with the end of the Cold War, there was a sudden surge in UN economic sanctions: Iraq (1990- ), the former Yugoslavia (1991-95), Libya (1992- ), Haiti (1993-94), Liberia (1992- ), Somalia (1992- ), UNITA in Angola (1993- ), and Rwanda (1994-95).
The infrequent use of sanctions regimes by the UN prior to 1990 reflects at least three realities. One is Article 2.7 of the Charter, which precludes UN intervention in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." While this principle does not preclude the application of the enforcement measures under Chapter VII, those advocating the use of economic or military sanctions must make the case that the potential or current conflict is a threat to international peace and security. Overriding Article 2.7 by determining that severe human rights abuses within states, notably Rhodesia and South Africa, constitute a threat to international peace and security ranks as one of the major developments of twentieth century diplomacy.
A second limitation is the need for major-power consensus within the Security Council to authorize mandatory sanctions. During the Cold War this was nearly impossible. The Soviet Union opposed any sanctions that would serve Western interests, while the U.S. and its allies resisted calls from the Soviet bloc and Third World countries for economic sanctions, most often against South Africa and Israel.
Third, the record of economic sanctions has not been encouraging. The most comprehensive and authoritative worldwide survey of the 116 attempts to use economic sanctions for foreign policy goals between 1914 and 1990 shows successful outcomes -- to which sanctions contributed at least modestly -- in barely one-third of the cases, where success is defined as achieving the primary stated goal of the sanctions. 4 Such judgments about the success or failure of these earlier efforts in persuading a target government to change its policies by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw economic relations are still controversial because of the complex and unique interplay of domestic and foreign interests in each case. 5 The United States took a leading role in imposing about 70 percent of the sanctions during this period, acting alone in approximately one-third of the cases. Collective sanctions make up less than 12 percent of these sanctions cases; the rest were either unilateral actions or noninstitutional ad hoc coalitions. 6
The new consensus that has enabled Security Council sanctions to proliferate since 1990 will be difficult to sustain. Differences among the Council's permanent members over where and when to use sanctions are becoming more pronounced, with China and some nonpermanent Council members, the smaller developing countries, opposed to UN intervention in the internal affairs of states. There is a growing restiveness among the UN's majority over the disproportionate power enjoyed by the five permanent members, particularly as their dominant post-World War II and Cold War roles in world affairs continue to decline.
Moreover, in a UN of 185 members, sanctions are a prerogative of the powerful few. Weak states not only lack the means to sanction strong states, but the Security Council veto power of the permanent members ensures that Article 41 and 42 will never be used against any of the major powers. This issue of fairness has been raised most vigorously by those countries that are not the targets of the sanctions but who, as neighbors or trading partners of the target, have been hurt by the sanctions to a greater degree than the U.S. and sanctions proponents. Yet, as the smaller powers that make up the UN's majority are quick to point out, they have little or no say in the decision to apply sanctions. These attitudes, and the spreading belief that sanctions have not achieved their ostensible objectives and are merely cynical ploys by major powers to appear to be "doing something" at minimal cost, are further undermining the UN's authority and making effective collective actions all the more difficult. Departing from this brief background, this report proceeds in four parts:
All key sanctions decisions will most likely remain the preserve of sovereign governments whose foreign policy goals and priorities reflect national interests that may not be compatible or reconcilable. These decisions range from whether or not to apply and abide by sanctions to their specific nature, scale, and duration. Gaining the necessary consensus to impose and sustain sanctions will therefore continue to be a function not of laws but of the political will of governments. This report examines the main structural and procedural impediments to success and how they might be overcome. Because Security Council action may be unlikely in response to situations of growing international concern, the report identifies alternative multilateral approaches that could be strengthened as tools of conflict prevention.