Politically, the aftertaste of apartheid is so bitter that no one of significance in South Africa would dare advocate openly a return to the old order. Racism will continue to infect South African society as it does other liberal democracies, and there are radical elements who are armed and capable of terrorism. But, fortunately, no opposition comparable to the challenge that resurgent Communism posed to Russian president BorisYeltsin exists in South Africa. And despite the demise of the apartheid state, the framework and key elements of government and public administration of that era--including the judiciary--have proven to be remarkably adaptable. They have played a crucial role in opening the way to sustainable democratic peace, in contrast to what has occurred in Russia and other countries in transition.
Economically, there has also been an initial gust of support with South Africa's re-entry into the global economy and the reversal of negative rates of growth that has opened the way to economic reforms. These efforts have been helped by the absence of any credible competing economic model to challenge the government's commitment to capitalism. The fortuitous collapse of Communism undercut those elements in the ANC who support nationalization of the private economy. South Africa's new leaders have also been realistic about the size of the economic disparities that must be overcome and have sought to keep the expectations of the poor in check, knowing that the resources simply are not available to radically alter the distribution of wealth and that to attempt such a futile move would probably destroy the nation's modern sector, the foundation for long-term sustainable growth. What is most striking, however, is the speed of accommodation between old and new elites who are prepared to rely on pragmatic deal making to accomplish as much market-based economic progress as possible while holding the country together.
Finally, there is an absence of any general ideological division in the country over the ANC's approach to nation building. Significant political conflict over the role of the state in South African society will continue, as it does in any democracy. There may even be, at some stage, the risk of a military coup or other tendencies toward authoritarianism. But no one is likely to come forward with a credible alternative to democratic ideals, ideals that appear to be sinking ever-deeper roots in South African society. This commitment to liberal democracy is reinforced by the widespread belief in Christianity that transcends racial and ethnic differences, another positive force inherited from the apartheid era. South Africa's civil society, which until the 1970s had been almost exclusively in white hands, grew rapidly in major black townships during the final years of the liberation struggle, and this should reinforce the popular base of support for democratic ideals.
But in the practical world of politics, this report has attempted to show that the road to economic and social transformation is certain to be long and treacherous. As the political momentum from successfully achieving majority rule dissipates, South Africa's leaders are bound to encounter many unexpected obstacles as they pursue macroeconomic and social objectives. New conflicts over the numbers and costs of illegal immigration, how to deal with the AIDS epidemic, and demands for greater cultural self-determination will surely arise. To keep moving forward, the government cannot rely on its own energy and sense of direction; it will need the sustained support of many others at home and abroad. Citizens and the media must also remain vigilant to ensure that the government does not burden itself with debilitating corruption, arrogance, or sectarian biases in the allocation of state employment and resources.
Ultimately, a successful journey through the next stages of economic and social transformation will depend as much on psychological factors as on quantitative indicators of economic growth, educational improvement, or a falling crime rate. Two hundred years of practical political experience, and innumerable national and cross-cultural studies, confirm that market democracy cannot be easily built from the top down, through social engineering. It must be built with social capital, especially trust. For democracy to flourish, citizens must believe that government policies are moving the country in the right direction and at a tolerable rate. Likewise, the government must trust in the people to do their part in assuming civic and other responsibilities of self-government and not to pursue extraconstitutional means of protest and resistance to policies they do not agree with. It is impossible to gauge the depth of current public trust in the ANC or how easily or quickly this could fracture if targets for economic growth and social improvements are not met. No democracy has discovered a reliable road map for distributing rights and obligations between the government and citizens as the political, economic, and social transformations proceed.
The most hopeful aspect of South Africa's approach to democratic transformation is the acceptance by the government that it must encourage the development of social capital at the grassroots level of national life so that the supply of civic involvement, mutual trust, and reciprocity increases throughout the nation. This is evident in the government's efforts to encourage local community involvement in housing, education, health care, crime prevention, and other social programs, and in the promotion of private enterprise. Much of this results from the need to stretch scarce government resources, but it is also encouraged by the new constitution and bill of rights, which provide the legal framework and space to allow civic organizations to thrive.
For trust to develop between the government and people in democratic South Africa, further development of a robust and diverse civil society is essential. President Mandela and other ANC leaders speak often and publicly about the vital role that the business community, civic organizations, trade unions, professional associations, and other religious, educational, youth, and cultural organizations must play in building a new South Africa. Although the majority of these groups were at the forefront of the internal anti-apartheid movement and continue to have strong ANC loyalties, Mandela's embrace of the civil society is nonpartisan.
Realism dictates that the burdens of developing South Africa must be broadly shared, particularly if the government adheres to its present policy of allowing white privilege to persist for the sake of domestic peace and in order to achieve more rapid economic growth. Idealism also justifies this approach because reciprocity is the fulcrum of self-government; those who receive public assistance should give something back. But adopting such policies in a country where so many are so very poor and so few are so very rich takes enormous courage, and those policies will be difficult to sustain.
The Development Facilitation Act, which Parliament approved in October 1995, aims to promote civic involvement by encouraging local communities to design their own comprehensive approach to infrastructure, social services, and job creation. A Transitional National Development Trust was enacted at the same time to support such actions. Public funds, however, remain tight. When the trust finally opened its doors in mid-1996, it had slightly more than $30 million available, with two-thirds of the money coming from the European Union, to satisfy requests in excess of $160 million. Despite these constraints, initial reports of government partnerships with local community groups have been encouraging. Successful demonstration programs in which the government provides limited financial support and technical assistance to communities that are prepared to contribute their own money and labor to build schools, health clinics, and improve water, sanitation, and police, suggest that the pace of economic and social transformation is proceeding at a politically tolerable rate.
The development of civil society must accelerate across South Africa. Neither the government nor local communities nor private industry have the financial, technical, and management resources to keep up with the huge and growing demand for basic services. International assistance will, therefore, continue to be critical for the success of democratic peace in South Africa. During the final decade of apartheid hundreds of millions of dollars from Western governments and private foundations poured into the nongovernmental organizations. Since 1994 much of this support has been diverted to assist the new government. In the case of the European Union, this sudden shift amounted to over $300 million annually. Many of the big national nongovernmental organizations that have played a major role in strengthening civil society at the grassroots level have suffered major losses of revenue and personnel as many key staff joined the new government.
Appeals to foreign governments to restore preliberation funding levels for NGOs are clearly unrealistic. Not only are they understandably eager to cultivate closer relations with the new government, but, as global levels of official development assistance are declining, the pressures to reallocate assistance to other more desperate countries is certain to increase. The United States, for example, has announced that its current annual grant level of $120 million will be reduced to zero by 2003.18
Many South African community activists and sympathetic government officials are hoping that private foundations in the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere will be able expand their presence in South Africa, at least for another decade.19 Their funding has allowed many of South Africa's most important NGOs to survive and to spread their programs into poor rural and urban communities throughout the country. With the return of more and more foreign corporations, some of whom are bidding on huge contracts to improve communications and other facilities, the government and civic leaders are beginning to press for greater corporate commitments to assist community development. If private and corporate foundations can be persuaded to partner more substantially and extensively with NGOs in South Africa's emerging civil society, the cumulative effects could not only help ensure democratic peace locally but could also contribute to the growing number of transnational NGO networks that are helping to advance this goal globally.
For those who help South Africa along the road to fuller democracy also help themselves. As aid agencies in the mature democracies of North America and Western Europe have begun to discover, one way to re-energize their own civil societies is to promote greater citizen involvement in the democratic transitions in South Africa and other nations. The effects of such engagement are difficult to quantify, but there is much anecdotal evidence that international NGOs not only play a generally positive role in helping other nations to develop economically and politically, they also generate a greater awareness of and support for such engagement among their grassroots supporters at home.20 In the 1980s international grassroots support for the successful campaign to end apartheid also served the interest of improving race relations in the United States and other pluralistic democracies with widespread popular interest in South Africa. Conversely, had South Africa erupted in race war, or should its democratic transition falter badly in the future, this could have a negative impact on the domestic well-being of these same donor nations.
South Africa is often described as such a "special case" that comparisons to other countries in transition are unlikely to be meaningful. Yet the deliberations about South Africa's "Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace" at the June 1996 conference in Cape Town reconfirmed the salience of several attributes common to democracies everywhere. First, although elites initiate political reform, true self-government can grow only from the grassroots upward. Second, democracy must be supported by three main pillars--democratic institutions, market economics, and civil society. The construction of these pillars, as the South African case has shown, can proceed at different rates at different times, but without sufficient strength in all three, democracy will collapse. South Africa's experience also points to a third universal truth: democratic development is a nonlinear process. And finally, policies of inclusion and fairness help build the resilience that will be necessary to withstand setbacks and unforeseen domestic and foreign obstacles to democratic development. All of this means, of course, that democracy can be built only gradually, over many generations, and in the face of changing circumstances it will never be perfect, only perfectible.
These hard realities recall a remark that Robert Kennedy made during his historic visit to the University of Cape Town at the height of apartheid. His words ring as true for the struggle to secure democracy as they did when the goal was to abolish apartheid:
Few will have the greatness to bend history itself; but each of us can work to change a small portion of events. And in the total of these acts will be written the history of this generation.
The role that Nelson Mandela and a handful of other remarkable leaders played in changing the course of South African history does not contradict the wisdom in Kennedy's remark. The opportunity to end apartheid suddenly and decisively was one of those rare hinge points in human events, and one that Mandela and F. W. de Klerk seized. The time for such dramatic actions has passed, although there will always be a need for good leadership. In consolidating democracy and overcoming chronic economic and social ills, however, leaders have no instant cures. Rather, as Kennedy's observation suggests, the progress of current and future generations will again be measured in much smaller steps. Fortunately, there is a reassuring depth of political talent in the generation of leaders who will succeed Mandela and who share his commitment to human rights and democracy. South Africa is no longer a house divided, but maintaining and remodeling its structures to accommodate one of the most diverse nations on earth will be an endless challenge for all of its citizens and for those abroad who care enough to help.
AGENDA
WEDNESDAY, June 19, 1996
6:00pm-9:00pm Opening Reception and Dinner
"Why the Three Miracles Matter"
Remarks by: Cyrus Vance
Cochair
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Mamphela Ramphele
Vice-Chancellor Elect
University of Cape Town
Colin Bundy
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic
University of the Western Cape
THURSDAY, June 20, 1996
8:30am-9:00am Introduction: "The Importance of the South African Experience to the International Community"
Presenter: Jane Holl
Executive Director
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
9:00am-10:00am "Opening the Way to Reconciliation: Why Leaders Matter"
Presenter: Tom Lodge
Witwatersrand University
Part I Consolidating the Political Miracle of Majority Rule
10:00am-12:00pm Session One: "Balancing Reconciliation with Justice: The Role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission"
Presenter: Desmond Tutu
Archbishop of Cape Town
Anglican Church
Discussants: Kader Asmal
Minister of Water Affairs
Beyers Naude
Co-director
Ecumenical Advice Bureau
12:00pm-1:30pm Session Two: "Constitutional Checks and Balances in South Africa's Democracy"
Presenter: Pravin Gordhan, mp
Discussants: Colin Eglin, mp
Harold Pakendorf
Political Advisor
Part II "Pursuit of an Economic Miracle: Growth and Equity"
2:30pm-4:00pm Session Three: "Creating a Viable Employment Market"
Presenter: Ebrahim Patel
Assistant General Secretary
South African Conference of Trade & Workers Unions
Discussant: David Bridgman
Chief Executive Officer
Wesgro
4:00pm-5:30pm Session Four: "The International Dimension of South Africa's Economic Transformation"
Presenter: Chris Saunders
Director
Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited
Discussants: Nicoli Nattrass
Department of Economics
University of Cape Town
Robert Davies, MP
FRIDAY, June 21, 1996
Part III "The Still Distant Social Miracle"
9:00am-10:00am Session Five: "Identities in Transition: The Search for a New South Africa"
Presenter: Mvume Dandala
Superintendent Minister
Johannesburg Central Methodist Mission
10:00am-11:30am Session Six: "Police Protection of Public Safety and Private Liberty"
Presenter: C. P. Steenkamp
Divisional Commander, Human
Resources and Management
South African Police Service
Discussant: Azhar Cachalia
Superintendent General
Secretariat of Safety and Security
11:30am-1:00pm Session Seven: "Financial and Fairness Realities in Education"
Presenters: Jairam Reddy
Chair
National Commission on Higher Education
John Samuel
Deputy Director General
Department of Education
Discussant: Brian O'Connell
Director of Education
Western Cape Province
2:30pm-4:00pm Session Eight: "Media and Government: Partners or Antagonists?"
Presenters: Moegslen Williams
Editor
Cape Times
Anton Harber
Editor
Weekly Mail and Guardian
4:00pm-4:15pm Conference Summary, Conclusions, and Challenges Ahead
Presenter: Jane Holl
PARTICIPANTS
Goolam Aboo Baker
Director
Cabinet Research and Executive Services
Office of the President
Republic of South Africa
Kader Asmal
Minister of Water Affairs
Republic of South Africa
Brigalia Bam
General Secretary
South African Council of Churches
Alex Boraine
Vice-Chair
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Republic of South Africa
David Bridgman
Chief Executive Officer
Wesgro
Azhar Cachalia
Superintendent General
Secretariat of Safety and Security
Republic of South Africa
Mvume Dandala
Superintendent Minister
Central Methodist Mission
Johannesburg
Robert Davies
Member of Parliament
Republic of South Africa
Colin Eglin
Member of Parliament
Republic of South Africa
Steven Friedman
Director
Center for Policy Studies
Pravin Gordhan
Member of Parliament
Republic of South Africa
Anton Harber
Editor
Weekly Mail and Guardian
Yusuf Hassan
Regional Public Information Officer for Southern Africa
UNHCR
Judith Hawarden
Academic Development Program
University of the Witwatersrand
Willie Hofmeyr
Member of Parliament
Republic of South Africa
Denis Hurley
Former Archbishop of Durban
Roman Catholic Church
Philip Krawitz
Chief Executive Officer
Cape Union Mart International
Tom Lodge
Professor of Government
Department of Political Studies
University of the Witwatersrand
Raymond Louw
Editor/Publisher
Southern Africa Report
Beyers Naude
Co-director
Ecumenical Advice Bureau
Dennis Nkosi
Director
Kwa-Zulu Peace Committee
Brian O'Connell
Director of Education
Western Cape Province
Harold Pakendorf
Independent Political Advisor
Ebrahim Patel
Assistant General Secretary
South African Conference of Trade and Workers Union
Ruth Rabinowitz
Senator
Republic of South Africa
Jairam Reddy
Chair
National Commission on Higher Education
Felicia Roman
Regional Director
National Business Initiative
John Samuel
Deputy Director General
Department of Education
Republic of South Africa
Chris Saunders
Director
Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited
Maggie Seiler
Director
National Peace Accord Trust
Charles Simkins
Professor
Department of Economics
University of the Witwatersrand
C. P. Steenkamp
Divisional Commander
Human Resources and
Management
South African Police Service
Desmond Tutu
Archbishop of Cape Town
Anglican Church
Constand Viljoen
Leader
Freedom Front
Moegslen Williams
Editor
Cape Times
SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS: PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS
University of Cape Town
Ampie Muller
Center for Conflict Resolution
Nicoli Nattrass
Professor
Department of Economics
Mamphela Ramphele
Vice-Chancellor Elect
Stuart Saunders
Vice-Chancellor
Helen Zille
Director
Development and Public Affairs
University of the Western Cape
Colin Bundy
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Esther Brimmer
Senior Associate
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
J. Wayne Fredericks
Counselor-in-Residence
Jane Holl
Executive Director
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Flora MacDonald
Member
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Shridath Ramphal
Member
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
John Stremlau
Advisor to the Executive Director
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Cyrus Vance
Cochair
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
David A. Hamburg, Cochair
President Emeritus
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Cyrus R. Vance, Cochair
Partner
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Gro Harlem Brundtland
Former Prime Minister of Norway
Virendra Dayal
Former Under-Secretary-General and
Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General
United Nations
Gareth Evans
Deputy Leader of the Opposition
and Shadow Treasurer
Australia
Alexander L. George
Graham H. Stuart Professor Emeritus
of International Relations
Stanford University
Flora MacDonald
Chairperson
International Development
Research Centre
Donald F. McHenry
University Research Professor of Diplomacy
and International Affairs
Georgetown University
Olara A. Otunnu
President
International Peace Academy
David Owen
Chairman
Humanitas
Shridath Ramphal
Cochairman
Commission on Global Governance
Roald Z. Sagdeev
Distinguished Professor
Department of Physics
University of Maryland
John D. Steinbruner
Senior Fellow
Foreign Policy Studies Program
The Brookings Institution
Brian Urquhart
Former Under-Secretary-General
for Special Political Affairs
United Nations
John C. Whitehead
Chairman
AEA Investors Inc.
Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan
Chairman, Board of Trustees
Aga Khan University and Hospital--Karachi
Special Advisor to the Commission
Herbert S. Okun
Visiting Lecturer on International Law
Yale Law School
Former U.S. Representative to the German
Democratic Republic and to the UN
Jane E. Holl, Executive Director
Members of the Advisory Council
Morton Abramowitz
Acting President
International Crisis Group
Ali Abdullah Alatas
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Indonesia
Graham T. Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Robert Badinter
President Emeritus
Constitutional Council of France
Carol Bellamy
Executive Director
United Nations Children's Fund
Harold Brown
Counselor
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
McGeorge Bundy*
Scholar-in-Residence
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Jimmy Carter
The Carter Center of Emory University
Lori Damrosch
Professor of Law
Columbia University School of Law
Francis M. Deng
Senior Fellow
Foreign Policy Studies Program
The Brookings Institution
Sidney D. Drell
Professor and Deputy Director
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Stanford University
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Senior Foreign Policy Advisor
Baker Donelson Bearman & Caldwell
Leslie H. Gelb
President
Council on Foreign Relations
David Gompert
Vice President
National Security Research
RAND
Andrew J. Goodpaster
Chairman
The Atlantic Council of the United States
Mikhail S. Gorbachev
The Gorbachev Foundation
James P. Grant**
Executive Director
United Nations Children's Fund
Lee H. Hamilton
United States House of Representatives
Theodore M. Hesburgh
President Emeritus
University of Notre Dame
Donald L. Horowitz
James B. Duke Professor of Law and
Political Science
Duke University School of Law
Michael Howard
President
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Karl Kaiser
Director
Research Institute of the German Society
for Foreign Affairs
Nancy Landon Kassebaum Baker
Baker Donelson Bearman & Caldwell
Sol M. Linowitz
Honorary Chairman
The Academy for Educational Development
Richard G. Lugar
United States Senate
Michael Mandelbaum
Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
Robert S. McNamara
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
William H. McNeill
Professor Emeritus of History
University of Chicago
Sam Nunn
Partner
King & Spalding
Olusegun Obasanjo
President
Africa Leadership Forum
Sadako Ogata
The High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Former Secretary-General
United Nations
Condoleezza Rice
Provost
Stanford University
Elliot L. Richardson
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Harold H. Saunders
Director of International Affairs
Kettering Foundation
George P. Shultz
Distinguished Fellow
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace
Stanford University
Richard Solomon
President
United States Institute of Peace
James Gustave Speth
Administrator
United Nations Development Programme
Desmond Tutu
Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town
James D. Watkins
President
Consortium for Oceanographic Research
and Education
Elie Wiesel
President
The Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity
I. William Zartman
Jacob Blaustein Professor of International
Organizations and Conflict Resolution
Director of African Studies and Conflict Management Programs
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
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