When South Africans went to the polls in April 1994 they ended a state of oppression that had become a global rallying point for all who wished an end to one of humanity's longest-running dramas; the struggle against slavery, colonialism, segregation, and other forms of institutionalized racism. For apartheid to end so suddenly and relatively peacefully seems especially remarkable against the backdrop of history's most violent century. But international euphoria has dissipated as the costs and uncertainties of consolidating democracy have become more evident.
Yet South Africa's recent political achievements could prove to be even more important for the opportunities they opened than for the dangers they foreclosed. Future historians may someday conclude that the current efforts to build democracy in a nation as culturally diverse, economically divided, and internationally renowned as South Africa have had a greater political impact on the global spread of democratic values in the twenty-first century than the fight against apartheid had for the spread of human rights in the twentieth century.
In the course of a journey as long and arduous as the struggle for majority rule in South Africa, it is tempting to think only of the difficulties ahead, rather than obstacles overcome. Pausing occasionally to take stock of what has been achieved can inspire renewed determination to press ahead. So in June 1996, midway through President Mandela's term of office, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, in cooperation with the Universities of Cape Town and the Western Cape, convened a two-day seminar in Cape Town. The meeting, "Miracles That Matter," brought together a group of South Africans who had been involved in South Africa's transition to democracy in various ways and gave them the opportunity to reflect on past progress and consider future prospects.*
For the South Africans, the conference was an opportunity to weigh differing perspectives in an attempt to see a balanced picture, and so avoid falling into the twin traps of premature triumphalism and forecasts of failure. For the Carnegie Commission it was an opportunity to learn lessons about preventing deadly conflict from the South African experience. This summary of the seminar proceedings is intended to inform an international audience about the current progress and prospects for democratic peace in South Africa, a nation that for decades appeared headed toward political and humanitarian catastrophe.
The seminar was organized around three broad challenges that face any country that is struggling to build a sustainable democracy: achieving accountable competent governance, broad-based economic prosperity, and social stability. How each challenge is addressed and in what sequence will depend upon a country's history, culture, resources, and other factors. In the case of South Africa, the seminar began with the country's foremost preoccupation: the political transformation from apartheid to inclusive constitutional democracy. Three elements were highlighted: the role of leadership in opening the way for national reconciliation and democracy; the importance of power sharing and the constitution that was adopted on May 8, 1996; and the process of redefining the national identity of South Africa's citizens, including coming to terms with the country's troubled history with the help of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Next on the agenda were key economic dimensions of South Africa's transformation, including unemployment and the June 1996 macro-economic strategy. Both are central to achieving economic growth, greater equity, and viable self-government.
Finally, the meeting addressed three elements germane to South Africa's social transformation and the emergence of a vibrant civil society: education, crime prevention, and the media. All three affect, and are affected by, progress on the political and economic fronts. South Africa's long-term political prospects will depend, as in any other democracy, not only on the government's capacity and willingness to meet the needs of the people, but also on the capacity and willingness of citizens to assume their civic responsibilities and obligations.
Although the focus of the meeting was primarily on South Africa's internal political, economic, and social dynamics, there were frequent references to the international community's stake in South Africa's domestic transformation. In retrospect, these can be summarized under three broad headings that were not on the conference agenda.
South Africa represents one of the world's most prominent and promising attempts to find a democratic answer to the most urgent question in post-Cold War international affairs: How can people with profound intergroup cultural, racial, and religious differences, compounded by a history of race-based political oppression and economic deprivation, govern themselves without fighting? Armed conflicts brought havoc to over thirty countries in 1995, nearly all of them multi-ethnic states that appear far less deeply divided than did South Africa only a few years ago. If South Africa succeeds, there are bound to be positive demonstration effects as other governments decide whether and how to empower the more than 900 million people in some 233 groups that political scientist Ted Gurr has identified as "minorities at risk."1 The international community is already turning to the new South Africa for leadership and advice in efforts to promote power sharing and democratic peace in Burundi, Nigeria, Burma, the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere.
Under international law, problems of national integration fall within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states. But South Africa's domestic affairs under apartheid eventually were deemed a legitimate concern of the international community. In one of the major diplomatic developments of the twentieth century the United Nations Security Council branded the human rights abuse of apartheid a threat to international peace and in 1979 imposed mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. How significant these actions were in weakening the resolve of the apartheid government, compared to the decisions by private banks to deny access to new capital and other measures, continues to be debated. But the efforts by the the majority of UN members to promote more vigorous intervention in South Africa's internal affairs acquired special political significance, as many of these states are vulnerable to foreign intervention and ordinarily oppose any infringement on a UN member's sovereign rights. Against this background and in light of its recent success, South African leaders speak with moral authority and political credibility when advocating restraint and respect for human rights in resolving ethnic conflicts elsewhere.
Among the many countries now in transition, South Africa also enjoys special status in the West. As the anti-apartheid movement gained momentum, especially in communities throughout the United States, it produced a degree of public concern with and understanding of South Africa's internal affairs that probably still exceeds that which Americans have for any other foreign country except Israel. No two societies share a deeper and more persuasive and convergent interest in race relations than South Africa and the United States. This shared interest gives their relationship special importance in the domestic and foreign affairs of both nations.
International economic sanctions became the principal policy instrument of governments opposed to apartheid and were accompanied by powerful grassroots campaigns in Europe and North America that forced corporate disinvestment in South Africa. There is consensus in South Africa and abroad that sanctions and the denial of access to foreign capital played a major role in promoting peaceful change. Now that majority rule prevails, South African leaders are campaigning strenuously for increased foreign investment and trade expansion in order to generate the economic surpluses necessary for building democracy and reducing economic and social inequities.
The major industrial powers all officially back these efforts. South Africa, whose 1995 GDP accounts for 45 percent of all sub-Saharan Africa's gdp, and which has the potential to become a major economic engine in the region, is regarded by Washington to be one of the world's ten most important "Big Emerging Markets."2 Yet the flow of private capital from other nations, including the United States, has been much slower than South Africans had hoped. South Africans of all races are dismayed by the hesitancy shown by international business in light of what they see as historic opportunities to develop long-term and highly profitable economic partnerships while also helping to build the foundation for sustainable democracy in South Africa.
Complementing the international economic sanctions campaign to end apartheid was a more positive commitment by foreign governments, private foundations, and citizen groups to build capacity for grassroots civil empowerment and the development of black leadership in South Africa. During the 1980s, hundreds of millions of dollars were provided to local civic associations, trade unions, professional groups, community-based education organizations, and a host of other organizations that have played a crucial role in South Africa's "bargaining culture," the key to democratic peace. With the end of apartheid, foreign donors have begun to reduce their programs or shift support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to assist the new government more directly. Many key government agencies are now headed and staffed by former NGO leaders.
Seminar participants urged continued international support for strengthening South Africa's civil society. The South African state has neither the resources nor the administrative capacity to bring about the social equity and citizen involvement that will be required to sustain democratic peace. Democracy, after all, depends on the diffusion of power, resources, and social responsibility to local communities, and a robust civil society will be crucial to long-term political stability and the peaceful preservation of cultural diversity. Continuing transnational cooperation with, and support for, the full range of NGOs that are vital to further strengthening pluralism in South Africa will be as important to consolidating democracy as the earlier efforts to acheive the peaceful overthrow of apartheid.
Under each of the conference's substantive topics South African participants also testified to the benefits they gained from surveying the experiences of other nations. Support from private and public donor agencies has been critical in helping future and current officials gain exposure to these alternatives. In the case of the constitution, teams visited other democracies and compiled vast amounts of historical and current information that led to the reformulation of South Africa's political system. Similar processes of fact-finding have been under way in education, where the policies of between 80 and 90 countries were studied before the 1996 White Paper on reform of South Africa's education system was issued. Information gleaned in this way has also proven very useful politically: seminar participants recalled how reference to what has or has not worked in other countries helped to break deadlocks in policy debates.
Finally, international donors, both public and private, should weigh the advantages of investing in South Africa in light of the potential impact these commitments might have on South Africa and the potential that South Africa holds as an example to others and as a source of practical advice and technical assistance to advance the cause of democratic peace elsewhere. Should the great South African transition to a pluralistic democracy fail, however, this will cast a dark shadow throughout Africa and on friends of democracy everywhere. In short, South Africa should be seen as a major building block for a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic order across Southern Africa and around the world. The extensive and diverse network of cooperation between the civil societies of South Africa and Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere also point to new opportunities for a deepening North-South cooperation in the post-Cold War era that could reinforce global order and help to revitalize civil societies in the mature democracies. Yet barely five years ago such cooperation did not seem even remotely possible.
South Africa is often described as such a "special case" that comparisons to other countries in transition are unlikely to be meaningful. Yet the deliberations about South Africa's "Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace" at the June 1996 conference in Cape Town reconfirmed the salience of several attributes common to democracies everywhere. First, true self-government can grow only from the grassroots upward. Second, democracy must be supported by three main pillars--democratic institutions, market economics, and civil society. The construction of these pillars, as the South African case has shown, can proceed at different rates at different times, but without sufficient strength in all three, democracy will collapse. South Africa's experience also points to a third universal truth: democratic development is a nonlinear process. And finally, policies of inclusion and fairness help build the resilience that will be necessary to withstand setbacks and unforeseen domestic and foreign obstacles to democratic development. All of this means, of course, that democracy can be built only gradually, over many generations, and in the face of changing circumstances it will never be perfect, only perfectible.
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