We have formulated three hypotheses about conflict prevention at the end of the century and the millennium. The challenge of preventing deadly conflict should be set in a wider historical context. In the last one hundred years, what has been the incidence of deadly conflict? What have been the principal factors that promoted or inhibited deadly conflict? What does this record suggest about preventable causes: What actions have been taken, and by whom, to prevent deadly conflict? What factors or processes have encouraged or discouraged such actions?
Of all the centuries in the second millennium, the twentieth has proved both the bloodiest and the most democratic. As a review of the rhetoric makes painfully evident, this century has also been the most presumptuous. The century opened with predictions that it would be the century of peace and prosperity. In 1903, Andrew Carnegie constructed in the Hague a "Palace of Peace" that he hoped and expected would symbolize the great achievement of the twentieth century.12 Just before the start of World War I, Norman Angell published a highly acclaimed book asserting that modern economic interdependence among states had removed the motives for waging war.13 In fact, as Winston Churchill saw more clearly, this was the century in which war finally "began to enter into its kingdom." As he wrote in 1929:
It was not until the dawn of the twentieth century of the Christian era that War began to enter into its kingdom as the potential destroyer of the human race. The organisation of mankind into great States and Empires, and the rise of nations to full collective consciousness, enabled enterprises of slaughter to be planned and executed upon a scale with a perseverance never before imagined. All the noblest virtues of individuals were gathered together to strengthen the destructive capacity of the mass. Good finances, the resources of world-wide credit and trade, the accumulation of large capital reserves, made it possible to divert for considerable periods the energies of whole peoples to the task of Devastation. Democratic institutions gave expression to the will-power of millions. Education not only brought the course of the conflict within the comprehension of everyone, but rendered each person serviceable in a high degree for the purpose in hand. The Press afforded a means of unification and of mutual encouragement; Religion, having discreetly avoided conflict on the fundamental issues, offered its encouragements and consolations, through all its forms, impartially to all combatants. Lastly, Science unfolded her treasures and her secrets to the desperate demands of men and placed in their hands agencies and apparatus almost decisive in their character. Mankind has never been in this position before. Without having improved appreciably in virtue or enjoying wiser guidance, it has got into its hands for the first time the tools by which it can unfailingly accomplish its own extermination [emphasis added]. That is the point in human destinies to which all the glories and toils of men have at last led them. They would do well to pause and ponder upon their new responsibilities. Death stands at attention, obedient, expectant, ready to serve, ready to shear away the peoples en masse; ready, if called on, to pulverise, without hope of repair, what is left of civilisation. He awaits only the word of command. He awaits it from a frail, bewildered being, long his victim, now-for one occasion only-his Master.14
Churchill's caution notwithstanding, as this century closes, those who envision a hopeful future should note a number of positive factors that present a special window of opportunity for at least a decade ahead, and quite possibly beyond. First, for the first time in its half-century life, one major prerequisite to the United Nations' becoming an active force in building and keeping the peace is in place. The Security Council is no longer immobilized by Cold War divisions. Thus, the UN was able to authorize and legitimize international efforts to defeat Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait, and more recently to stop the killing in Bosnia. Despite the many limitations of the UN, especially incapacities that grew up during decades of the Cold War stalemate, these new conditions make it possible to imagine a reconceptualization of a UN that would be more capable of achieving the goals its founding fathers set five decades ago. Second, for the first time in several hundred years, the international system is not organized around and paralyzed by great-power rivalry. Third, in contrast to earlier periods, the extent of agreement across the international community about basic international norms, a degree of international law, and indeed some systems and instruments for preventing conflict, is also unprecedented. Fourth, the imperial regimes most responsible for the deadliest initiatives of the century have disappeared or declined. Looking back, the biggest villains in the deadly conflicts of this century have been bad regimes with bad leaders, whether Hitler, Stalin, Mao, or Pol Pot. Fifth, at this century's end, with the disappearance of the former Soviet Union, the United States remains the sole military superpower. With military dominance, global reach, and relatively benign values, the United States together with its principal democratic allies in NATO and in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty have the capability to become a special force in preventing deadly conflict. The UN-authorized, NATO-led peace enforcement initiative in Bosnia suggests what can be done if the able are also willing. Finally, globalization of communications has raised consciousness of deadly conflicts across the international community, leading at a minimum to increased attention and anguish in the "civilized community." Contrast reactions to genocide in Cambodia, on the one hand, and Rwanda, on the other. In the former case, lack of awareness prevented action, and few called for it. In the latter, the international community was unable to mobilize itself for action, and deserves indictment for that failure. But inaction clearly stirred consciousness in much larger numbers of people and is spurring a search for alternative international arrangements that will make it possible to act in future cases.
The historical experiences of states in the current international system significantly affect the lessons each has learned. These experiences have shaped the lenses each looks through in addressing the question of international actions to prevent deadly conflict. For most observers in the United States, Europe, and Japan, the contrast between the responses in the aftermath of World War I and those at the end of World War II is decisive. In the first instance, retreat from engagement and an attempt to punish the aggressors created conditions for the rise of fascism and the Great Depression, making the two decades after Versailles a mere intermission before the war in Europe resumed. In contrast, after World War II, more farsighted statesmen followed Churchill's maxim: in victory, magnanimity. The Marshall Plan's reconstruction of the vanquished, common defense alliances in NATO and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the establishment of international financial institutions that promoted trade and growth have been key factors in providing a "long peace" of five decades without world war, and sustained economic growth unparalleled in the history of these nations.
These formative historical experiences fuel current initiatives to expand and enlarge democracy, promote the development of market economies, and integrate nations of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union into established Western institutions. While these efforts have been less magnanimous and vigorous and much less generous than we believe would be wise, the eagerness of Western Europe's neighbors to join the established Western "clubs," and to do so on the basis of these clubs' established norms and rules, has made these institutions-NATO, the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe-powerful instruments in promoting free markets, democracy, and the prevention of conflict within societies and between societies. Indeed, the extent to which citizens in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union now conceive of these Western norms as the content of what they call a "normal society" or "civilized society" has been a powerful magnet and motivator of actions that in fact prevent deadly conflict.15
In contrast, the Asian experience, particularly of societies that were victims of earlier Western crusades to commercialize, Christianize, and colonize, constrains their enthusiasm for a new wave of instruction about democracy and conflict prevention. But East Asia's recent economic turmoil has probably increased the region's willingness to explore new economic and political arrangements. Africa, as well, remains a special, particularly urgent challenge, deserving of further attention.16
These historical experiences, and the lessons drawn from them, inform different approaches to preventing deadly conflict. Some fear most new forms of imperialism. Thus they urge only "universal" solutions with universal rules and actions by universal actors, like the United Nations. Others are more impressed by the effectiveness of the institutions that evolved in the Cold War setting on a less universal basis, and are thus more inclined to coalitions of common values-the like-minded, the willing, and the able-like the G-7, or the Summit of Eight, or NATO, or other "clubs" and organizations. A blending of these two perspectives has been fashioned in the universally based UN authorization of actions by regional or local states and organizations; for example, the UN mandate for NATO-led peacekeeping in Bosnia.